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and considered: (1) geography associated with the Eastern border of the European continent 
and its flexibility; (2) cultural trends, mainly provided by the ideas of the Enlightenment, 
which present the eastern part as wild, barbaric and uncivilized; (3) political formations, 
which by military and political means conquered or lost the region, alienating it with the West 
or making it a ‘buffer zone’; (4) Economic aspects of backwardness and the constant try to 
catch-up with the West; and (5) the discourse about the region itself, historiography depicting 
the formations and ascribing labels to discourse.
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I. Introduction
1.1. Eastern Europe: Between history and destiny
Illustrations used in history books and textbooks, can usually show historical events in 
a certain light, one that has the power to evoke the mood and destiny lurking behind the 
picture. One illustration, which does just this, is Jean-Michel Moreau le Jeune’s ‘Le Gateau 
des Rois’ (The cake of Kings or Royal cake). Moreau le Jeune’s work is an engraving, which 
represents eighteenth century East Central Europe by allegorically depicting the first partition 
of Poland in 1772. The work shows Catherine the Great of Russia, Joseph II of Austria, and 
Frederick the Great of Prussia around the map of Poland, while the last king of the Polish- 
Lithuanian Commonwealth tries to hold on to his crown. The event is an important part of 
European history, and also illustrates East Central European destiny.
To understand Eastern Europe is to know its history and to engage with its destiny. 
Here, it might seem that the word ‘destiny’ sounds too poetic to be attached to Eastern 
Europe. But Eastern Europe’s destiny and history are inextricably linked. In other words, one 
cannot simply study the history of Eastern Europe. When theorists try to use history as a link 
between what Eastern Europe is today and how it has developed, the result is often one that 
depends on a Western concept of history. Thus, to truly understand Eastern Europe is to 
understand not only its history, but also its destiny. This destiny is best exemplified by a 
constant struggle to show that Eastern Europe is not merely some peripheral attachment to the 
West, but also an important part of Europe. Writers, such as Milan Kundera and Vaclav Havel 
have interpreted this sentiment best; creating works that show the region is something integral 
and an essential part of everything European.1
The initial difficulty in trying to retrace how the concept of Eastern Europe was 
formed is the duality of problems. One has to deal with the history of Europe and the history 
of the region, at the same time trying to retrace the differences or similarities, which 
influenced the creation of Eastern Europe. The problem, of course, is the enormous amount of 
material and insights, and the long course of history itself.
1 The ideas o f “Kidnapped West” and “Return to Europe” are discussed in Joshua Hagen’s article ‘Redrawing 
the Imagined Map o f Europe: the Rise and Fall o f the “Center” ’, Political Geography. 22, 2003, pp. 489-517 
(thereafter Hagen, ‘Redrawing the Imagined Map of Europe’).
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The ‘eastern’ label was attached to the region by the Western part of Europe after 
several major events and changes in thinking overtime. Evolving enemies, borders, and other 
shifts in European history, participated in conceptualizing Eastern Europe. From ancient 
Greece to the Iron Curtain, all divisions in Europe have been represented by a dichotomy 
between two opposing sides, for example: barbarism versus civilization, economic 
advancement versus backwardness, great discoveries and the taming of the ocean versus the 
shifting frontier and the threat of the Orient. These oppositions have constructed lines and 
walls, both mental and physical, which have divided Europe. Europe has also been divided by 
many events throughout history, for instance: the Roman Empire, Christianity, The 
Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, Industrialization, and the World Wars. All of these 
events have had a hand in the development of Europe, changing its destiny and creating a new 
vision of what the region does or does not encompass. To understand the influence of the 
oppositional dichotomies and events that have shaped Europe, one must first engage with its 
history.
The history of Europe, however, is ambiguous and can mean many different things to 
many different people. That being said, every historian can write the history of Europe 
differently. A. J. P. Taylor, for example, when asked to describe what European history is, 
wrote in his journal:
European History is whatever the historian wants it to be. It is a summary of 
the events and ideas, political, religious, military, pacific, serious, romantic, near at 
hand, far away, tragic, comic, significant, meaningless, anything else you would like it 
to be. There is only one limiting factor. It must take place in, or derive from, the area 
we call Europe. But as I am not sure what exactly that area is meant to be, I am pretty 
well in haze about the rest.
If European history can be everything a historian wants it to be, then Eastern European 
history is the history of struggle to be part of that everything. And it is, although, sometimes 
with different results. The main idea here is that diversity is a part of Europe. It is what 
Europe is all about. Essentially, it is made up of a large number of comparatively small areas 
comprised of: enemies, friends, nations, countries, economies, politicians, ideas, religious 
splits, conquerors, and unifications.
2 Quoted from Norman Davies, Europe. New York: Oxford University Press 1996, (hereafter, Davies, Europe), 
p. 45.
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The aim of my thesis is to explore Europe’s diversity and to portray how it has 
affected and constructed the concept of Eastern Europe overtime. My research will focus on 
Eastern Europe by examining the history of Europe as a whole and the events and ‘trends’ 
witnessed overtime. An ever-evolving history has dictated what Eastern Europe is and how it 
is conceptualized. But because history also encompasses many different elements, my thesis 
will adopt a theoretical framework, argument, and structure, which will explore different 
aspects of history, and ultimately discuss the construction of ‘Eastern Europe’.
1.2. Eastern Europe constructed: note on theoretical premises, methods, argument and
structure of the thesis
Conceptions of Eastern Europe have been formed from historical understandings, 
which have also led to stereotypes about its backwardness and its inability to civilize itself 
according to the standards of Western Europe. However, the region is so diverse and has had 
so many different roles within European history, that it is impossible to attribute only one 
characteristic to it. In other words, conceptualizing it from a western stereotypical point of 
view is only one way to view it. Ultimately, some conceptions are just ‘western prejudice’ 
and discourse based on ignorance and narrow understandings. The problem, however, is that 
it is impossible to escape this discourse. Even one willing to show the Enlightenment’s fruits 
in Bohemia or Poland would have to employ the Enlightenment’s own labels, which disregard 
the region. E. Hobsbawm argues, that all historians are engaged in the process of creating an 
invented tradition ‘as they contribute, consciously or not, to the creation, dismantling and 
restructuring of images of the past which belong not only to the world of specialist 
investigation but to the public sphere of man as political being. Hobsbawm encouraged 
others to not only show how history was or is portraying the region, but to argue against these 
simplified depictions, and show that diversity is the most significant aspect of the region, not 
one-sided ‘eastern’ labels.
This goal dictates the major theoretical premises of my research: to regard the concept 
of Eastern Europe as constructed. The region’s history is part of European history, but all of 
the historical events in Europe attached certain parameters to the concept, forcing the label 
‘eastern’. This not only depicts its place in relation to the West, but also associates it with an
3 Eric Hobsbawm, ‘Introduction: Inventing Traditions’ in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.) The 
Invention o f  Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 (hereafter, Hobsbawm, ‘Inventing 
traditions’), p. 13.
often-negative discourse. Historically, events can be connected to each other, emphasizing the 
division between Eastern and Western Europe. In E. Hobsbawm’s words ‘inventing the 
tradition’.4 The tradition of Eastern Europe is to be somehow ‘lesser’ or ‘not quite European’, 
relying on a distorted picture of Europe that only the western part provides. Hobsbawm’s 
‘invented tradition’ influenced the method of my analysis. Thus, the major aim is to show 
those sets of practices and certain values and norms of behavior, which by repetition imply 
continuity with a suitable historical past.5 In order to prove the relevance of this concept, I 
will examine how certain historical events and divisions were associated with each other.
But as Hobsbawm contends, the study of invented traditions cannot be separated from 
the wider study of a society’s history.6 To analyze the history of society more thoroughly, 
methodology from ‘political geography’ was used. Political geography gave valuable insights 
into imagined geography, which according to J. Hagen ‘refers to ways of perceiving spaces 
and places, and the relationships between them, as complex sets of cultural and political 
practices and ideas defined spatially, rather than regarding them as static, discrete territorial 
units’.7 The constructions of regions are representations of worldviews and discursive 
formations, influenced by power, knowledge, and spatiality.
In order to understand the discursive formations, some historical background is 
needed, showing the power relations and mindset of the time. To do this, P. Burke’s 
suggested history of ‘mentalities collectives’ was utilized. Burke argued that in order to 
understand what Europe meant for earlier generations, it must be placed in the ‘repertoire’ of 
concepts, which express group identity in different times and places.9 These concepts derive 
their meanings from their place in the repertoire, ‘a system in which it is associated with some 
concepts and opposed to others’.10
The methodology used is part of a two dimensional analysis: one dimension is devoted 
to the idea of Europe and events and practices, which changed it and the other focuses on 
Eastern Europe, which discusses how not only these events, but also the changing idea of 
Europe influenced it. The analysis of ideas about Europe is mostly background and 
horizontal, while analysis of Eastern Europe is deep and vertical, divided according to certain 
parameters, which influenced the concept during any particular time period.
4 Hobsbawm, ‘Inventing traditions’.
5 Hobsbawm, ‘Inventing traditions’, p. 1.
6 Hobsbawm, ‘Inventing traditions’, p. 12.
7 Hagen, ‘Redrawing the Imagined Map o f Europe’, p. 490.
8 Hagen, ‘Redrawing the Imagined Map o f Europe’, p. 490.
9 Peter Burke, ‘Did Europe Exist before 1700?’, (hereafter, Burke, ‘Europe before 1700’), History o f European 
Ideas. 1, 1980, pp. 1-6, (p. 22).
10 Burke, ‘Europe before 1700’, p. 22.
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This work will argue that several labels and aspects of history have influenced the 
concept of Eastern Europe, but some have been more influential than others. In my view there 
are five important aspects to consider: (1) geography associated with the Eastern border of the 
European continent and its flexibility; (2) cultural trends, mainly provided by the ideas of the 
Enlightenment, which present the eastern part as wild, barbaric and uncivilized; (3) political 
formations, which by military and political means conquered or lost the region, alienating it 
with the West or making it a ‘buffer zone’; (4) Economic aspects of backwardness and the 
constant try to catch-up with the West; and (5) the discourse about the region itself, 
historiography depicting the formations and ascribing labels to discourse.
The biggest difficulty is trying to keep the balance between what is happening (in 
general) in Europe and how it influences Eastern Europe, and at the same time creating a 
distinctive idea about it. This is problematic for several reasons. First, though it is the history 
of Europe, questions about when Europe received the meaning attributed to it today, have to 
be accounted for. It is rather slippery to talk about Europe before the eighteenth century. 
Nonetheless, one cannot exclude the Middle Ages and Christianity, as these are the basis of 
European identity.
There is also a constant question: What is included in the region? Though the region 
stretches (or might stretch) from the Baltic coast to the southern end of the Balkan Peninsula, 
the majority of examples about the actual landmass Eastern Europe composes consist of lands 
from the historic kingdoms of Poland-Lithuania, Bohemia, and Hungary, as well as the lands 
of their conquerors and rulers (Germany, Austria and Russia). Thus the history of Eastern 
Europe is indivisible from the history of Central Europe. It is based on the regional divisions 
of Oscar Halecki,11 which represent the most appreciated view used in the thesis. It is never 
just about the East, the ideas are coming from the West and end in the vastness of Russia.
The many arguments about the parameters of Eastern Europe help guide the structure 
of my thesis. The first part is dedicated to introductory and background history about the idea 
of Europe. It then analyzes the major ‘trends’ and upheavals, which influenced and changed 
it. These events are later reproduced in other parts of the paper, which deal with specific 
aspects of Eastern Europe to correlate them and show how certain events in Europe 
influenced the concept of Eastern Europe. The other five sections are labeled according to the 
main argument o f the work: the concepts of Eastern Europe contain geographical, cultural, 
political, economic, and historiographical patterns. The first four parts are framed in a time
11 Oscar Halecki, Borderlands of Western Civilization. A History o f East Central Europe. 2nd edn, Safety 
Harbor, FL: Simon Publications 2000 (hereafter, Halecki, Borderlands).
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scope from the Middle Ages until the twenty-first century, while the last historiographical part 
analyses the more general problems of history writing and its influence on concept formation.
II. Historical Background: Ideas of and about Europe
If one tries to explain or describe what Europe means, there are several ways and 
outcomes of the decision. For example, Europe could be viewed as a: continent, way of life, 
or a conglomerate of certain states. Europe has its geographical, cultural, political, and 
economic meanings and descriptions, and it is always something more, something that can be 
not only noticed but also felt. However, all these conceptions are subordinate to time and 
history, which has formed the concept of Europe. As Gerard Delanty points out, Europe is 
created by history and it is history at the same time.12 But all of this history has to start 
somewhere, and this beginning can best be traced to a myth.
Europa was the name of an Asian princess who was the daughter of Agenor, King of 
Tyre, and was abducted and carried to Crete by Zeus. She was carried to another continent, 
for which she gave her name. The myth comes from ancient Greece, and is regarded as the 
birthplace of European civilization, inspiring artists for ages to come. Ovid’s 
‘Metamorphoses’ immortalized Europa with a lavish feminine accent, preserving the mythical 
birth of Europe until the end of time. It is not only the name of the continent it is also the 
Greek Other, oppositional Asia. Conflict between the two continents was locked for hundreds 
of years, and determined what Europe was, is, and will become.
For Greeks, Europe was a geographical term. It was used as a name for the continent, 
discerning it from Asia and Africa. However, Europe for Greeks was also associated with 
Hellas13, the lands around the Aegean Sea, opposed to Asia and Africa. As G. Delanty 
describes, Classical Antiquity linked the idea of Europe with the concept of Occident, which 
at the beginning meant the Eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea basin.14 It was not a cultural 
idea, but a geographical Hellenistic Occident. The most important distinction made by Greeks 
was between Us and Them, and the Them were not only peoples from Asia. The Northern 
lands of the continent were unknown and alien as well.
12 Gerard Delanty, Europos Isradimas: Ideia. Tapatumas. Realvbe. trans. Almantas Salamaviciuc, Lietuvos 
rasytojij sqjungos leidykla: Vilnius, 2002 (hereafter, Delanty, Europos Isradimas). p. 16.
13 Anthony Pagden, ‘Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent’, (hereafter, Pagden, ‘Conceptualizing a Continent’) 
in Anthony Pagden (ed.) The Idea o f Europe from Antiquity to the European Union. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, pp. 33-54, (p. 36)
14 Delanty, Europos Isradimas. p. 37.
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The distinction between the Greek world and people, who were not touched by Greek 
culture and whom Greeks could not understand - barbarians - was the most important 
distinction in their worldview. The Greek division of the world into civilized and barbarous 
was a precursor to the conception of Europe’s cultural superiority.15 ‘In the Greek worldview, 
and in the conceptions of generations of Europeans, to live like a “barbarian” or a “savage” 
meant living as something less than human’.16 It was not the opposition of Europe against 
Asia, but political dualism (Us versus Them; Civilization versus Barbarism) and the formation 
of ethnocentrism, which are the most important formations of the Classical period.17
Jacques Le Goff summarizes that Ancient Greece’s legacy to Europe was embedded in
its opposition to the East and a democratic model. The latter, in his opinion, reappeared in
18improved forms only at the time of the French revolution. Le Goff also adds Greek polis as 
a precursor to medieval towns, and the city that is most significant in the development of 
European identity.19 But the most influential Greek heritage, shaping European ideas in later 
centuries, was classical civilization itself and its association with the name ‘Europe’ given by 
the Greeks.
Roman civilization followed the Greek division of the world into three continents, but 
the Roman World was concentrated around the Mediterranean and it encompassed a region 
and not the continent. Nonetheless, the Roman way of life was distinct, which discerned it 
from the Other. Additionally, communal life was attributed to Europe, as a specific 
environment, and reached its peak with the dominant stance of Rome.20 Romans did not 
discern separate identities between the people outside their world, as a result all were seen as 
uncivilized barbarians. In this worldview, the most important civilizing aspect was ‘the law’.
As Anthony Pagden affirms, ‘Romans elevated the law to a place it still holds today - as the
21sole guarantor of the continuity of “civilization”’.
It has to be said that despite the distinctiveness of Roman civilization, it was first 
Roman and not European. Gerard Delanty argues that even though the word Europe existed,
15 Norman Davies, Europe East and West. London: Pimlico, 2007 (hereafter, Davies, Europe East and W est), p. 
34.
16 Pagden, ‘Conceptualizing a Continent’, p. 41.
17 Delanty, Europos Isradimas. p. 36.
18 Jaques Le Goff, The Birth o f Europe, trans. Janet Lloyd, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2005 (hereafter, 
Le Goff, The Birth o f Europe), p. 9.
19 Le Goff, The Birth o f  Europe, p. 10.
20 Pagden, ‘Conceptualizing a Continent’, p. 41.
21 Pagden, ‘Conceptualizing a Continent’, p. 42.
12
the concept of ‘Europeans’ was very rare.22 Hellenism and Rome were more important points 
of distinction, as the idea of European identity did not yet exist.
Nonetheless, as Le Goff describes the Romans considered the Bible to be of ‘capital 
importance’.23 And ‘it was through [the] intermediary of Christianity that God became a part 
of the thought and history of Europe’.24 With the adoption of Christianity, the distinction of 
civilized and barbaric was supplanted by Christianity versus paganism. The division of the 
Roman Empire into two parts in 286 is what brought the opposition between East and West. 
When Constantine moved the capital to Constantinople and the western part was absorbed by 
barbarians, the occidental tradition was moved to the East. In the years to come, however, 
Constantinople became increasingly oriental and Greek; it became Byzantine, Oriental, as 
well as heir of the Roman Empire, retaking its imperial traditions. In such a division, the 
concept of Occident and Europe was attributed to the western part of the former Roman 
Empire, and it became the European Occident. It started to identify itself with Latin 
Christianity,26 and in later years Europe and Occident became synonyms of Christianity.
The major impact on the formation of Europe related to Christianity was the rise of 
Islam. The Medieval ages witnessed a constant battle between Christianity and Islam, which 
coming from the East, became Oriental and alien Other. Europe, as Christian West, formed 
itself in opposition to the Orient, which became its most fierce enemy and cultural Other. The 
collision of two separate religions and cultures formed the distinct, unique and autonomous 
Europe, and Europe identified with Christianity.27 It was Christianity and not Europe, which
was a significant mark of identification. As Peter Burke asserts, in the medieval repertoire of
28concepts expressing group identity, “Europe” had a relatively minor place’. But as 
Christianity engulfed the continent, it became Europe’s label. The Christian conquest was not 
directed only toward the Muslim East. The thousand-year process of Christianizing pagan 
Europe meant that Europe ceased to be only a geographical idea, and Christianity began to 
coincide with the borders of the continent. It is important to stress the point made by Norman 
Davies, that ‘the modem descendants of pagan, barbarian invaders like the English and the 
Magyars who had destroyed the Christian civilization of the countries they invaded,
22 Delanty, Europos Isradimas. p. 39.
23 Le Goff, The Birth o f  Europe, p. 12,
24 Le Goff, The Birth o f  Europe, p. 12
25 Delanty, Europos Isradimas. p. 40.
26 Delanty, Europos Isradimas. p. 41.
27 Delanty, Europos Isradimas. p . 45.
28 Burke, ‘Europe before 1700’, p. 23.
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?Qnonetheless appropriated the Romano-Christian tradition as their own’. As northern tribes
30accepted Christianity, Europe left the Mediterranean Sea and moved toward the Baltic. The 
Christian world became the Occident, and the battle of Tours in 732 was a symbolic turn, 
denoting Christian, European powers wining against Muslims. This battle symbolized the 
birth of Europe as a proto-cultural idea, and it had a major impact on the formation of 
europeocentric worldviews.31 And though, as Le Goff states, the battle in historiography is 
portrayed between ‘mere skirmish’ and ‘hugely important event’ it was a European event
i t
nonetheless, and a victory of the West against the East.
Christianity not only adopted classical knowledge about divisions of the world into 
three continents. It also ascribed new meanings to it, mainly the idea that Europe, Asia and 
Africa were inhabited by the descendants of the three sons of Noah: Japheth as a forefather of 
pagan and Christian Greeks, Shem as a forefather of Semitic people (Jews and Arabs), and 
Ham as forefather of hamitic Africa.33 The three sons were attributed to three continents and 
Japheth became the father of Europeans. Famous medieval T and O maps show this division 
of the world and Christian iconography attributed the names of the sons of Noah to the names 
of the continents. Christian mythology went further, emphasizing the superiority of the 
descendants of Japheth, relating it to the book of Genesis, which states that ‘he [Japheth] will 
dwell in the tents of Shem’.34 This idea reached the modem times as a conceptual tool of 
europeocentric stories, which divided nations into races. Inheriting the civilized-barbaric 
division from the Classical period, Christianity became civilized and culturally superior, 
while the non-Christian world became uncivilized and barbaric. Delanty stresses that the 
Christian Church took the Roman idea of Universal Empire and transformed it into the
Universal Church; the cult of the emperor became the cult of the pope. 6 The reach for a
Universal Empire became one of the main elements of European identity.
However, it was not only the Muslim Other, which tied European identity with 
Christianity. Muslims represented the Orient, the other continent, but pagans were inside the 
continent. It was the western and southern part of Europe, which was Christian, but pagan 
tribes inhabited lands in the north and east. The Christianization drive north to east ended in
29 Davies Europe East and West, p. 34.
30 Delanty, Europos Isradimas. p . 45.
31 Delanty, Europos Isradimas. p. 42.
32 Le Goff, The Birth of Europe, pp. 26-27.
33 Denys, Hay, Europe: The emergence o f an idea. 2nd. eds. Edinburgh: University Press, 1968 (hereafter Hay, 
Europe), pp. 1-15.
34 Gen 9:27
35 Delanty, Europos Isradimas. p. 46.
36 Delanty, Europos Isradimas. p. 47.
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the early fifteenth century when the last pagan stronghold, Samogitia (part of Lithuanian 
Grand Duchy), was Christianized. By the time the Lithuanian Grand Duchy was accepting 
Christianity, it chose not only abolition of local pagan traditions, but also one branch of 
Christianity over the other. It was either Orthodox Christianity or Latin (the important choice 
after 1054).
"3 *7
The Great Schism then showed that European Christendom was never fully united. 
After the fourth Crusade this schism was accentuated and the Greek Church was distanced 
from the Latin West.38 The cultural Other, forming Europe, was the Muslim Orient, but Greek 
Christianity constituted another division, which although in Europe, was different from the 
West as well. It was another cultural Other inside Europe.
The dispute between Latin and Orthodox Christianity had a particular importance 
during the Frankish rule led by Charlemagne. Charlemagne, referred to as ‘The Father of 
Europe’ in historiography, managed to unite a considerable part of European lands to receive 
his title. The East-West schism of the Christian Church was a useful tool for his consolidation 
of power. He supported western Latin Christianity, accepting its stance during the iconoclastic 
wars, which shook the Byzantine world. After a second council of Nicaea in 787, 
Charlemagne ordered the composition of his Libri Carolini. In these he condemned the 
destruction and rejection of images and iconoclasm worship. Thus, western Christendom 
revered images, not making them objects of the cult. Le Goff regards such a decision as ‘a 
path that was to prove richly rewarding for European art’. But the most important was 
Charlemagne’s alliance with the pope of Rome.
When Pope Leo III crowned Charlemagne as Frankish emperor, he sought to 
strengthen Latin Christendom’s independency from the Byzantine Empire and Greek 
Orthodoxy. Papacy’s will was to ‘restore the extreme Christian West as an empire centred on 
Franks’.40 The creation of a Carolingian Empire and its alliance with the western branch of 
Christianity of course distanced it from Byzantium in the East, promoting the Occidental 
image of Europe. But from the territorial perspective, Charlemagne’s dominion could hardly 
be described as Europe, as it left huge territories out of its rule. However, Le Goff suggests 
that the importance of Charlemagne’s Frankish empire lies not in its unifying attempts inside 
Europe, but in its ‘failed attempts to construct a Europe dominated by one people or one
37 Davies, Europe East and West, p. 35.
38 Delanty, Europos Isradimas. p. 48.
39 Le Goff, The Birth o f  Europe, p.p. 26.
40 Le Goff, The Birth o f  Europe, p. 32.
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empire’,41 which was the first of such attempts, but not the last in history. It should be 
regarded more as an attempt to resurrect the Roman Empire than to project ‘Europe’.
Charlemagne’s failure to unify the Carolingian empire as a major European power is 
easily observed when one examines pagan Norman Viking lands in the North or the Iberian 
Peninsula ruled by Muslims. What is more, the Carolingian Empire did not succeed in 
conquering most of the German or Slavic lands. Its hereditary achievement for future 
generations was support for the Westem-Latin branch of Christianity, which became 
identified with the Occident, and Occident’s self-identification in opposition to Muslim power 
in the East. Muslims played an important role as a counter-civilization. After all, Professor 
Norman Davies, quoting Henri Pirenne, asserts that ‘Charlemagne without Muhammad would 
have been inconceivable’.42
Latin Christianity wanted to equate the Christian world with the territory of Europe, 
and employed offensive strategies against its Other, non-Christians and pagans, in order to 
consolidate the powers inside the European continent. The Crusades and Reconquista of the 
Iberian Peninsula are the most prominent examples of such thinking and behaviours. 
European identity was based on violence against the non-Christian Other, which according to 
Le Goff, was a result of the evolution of the pacifist Christian faith into warfare.43 This was 
the theory of just war, which in theory was supposed not to be aggressive and justified when 
waged against pagans and ‘infidels’ such as Muslims.44
The Crusading Europe was a way of achieving power for Latin Christendom with 
papacy at its head and the entanglement of religious and political powers, which could belong 
to the supreme religious leader, whom the pope wished to become.45 The biggest achievement 
of the Crusades was a Christian unity, which also meant unity of the European continent. 
Though the eastern Crusades into the Holy Land were not successful, the northern and 
western lands were still turned to the Christian faith. The reclaiming of Spain and 
Christianization of the last pagan lands of Lithuania turned Europe into bastion of 
Christianity. However, Le Goff argues that the overall result was negative because it widened 
the gap between western and eastern Christian churches and sharpened the rivalry between 
Christian states in Europe.46 But the crusades succeeded in making Christianity the label of 
Europe as Byzantium saw them not as a Christian counterbalance to Islam, but a threat to
41 Le Goff, The Birth o f Europe, p. 29.
42 Davies, Europe East and W est, p. 10.
43 Le Goff, The Birth o f Europe, p. 93.
44 Le Goff, The Birth o f Europe, p. 94.
45 Le Goff, The Birth o f Europe, p. 95.
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their existence.47 The widening of the gap between Eastern and Western branches of 
Christianity reached its peak during the fourth crusade in 1204, when crusaders destroyed 
Constantinople. It was an important gesture of European association with the Occident, and it 
was a western branch of Christianity, which became a denominator of Europe, and Europe 
became Occident.
However, Occident was not able to conquer the Orient. The Muslim power later 
supplanted by Ottoman Turks was more advanced and steadily threatened the European 
powers. It was a threat for the entire continent. Delanty claims this threat and all losses 
suffered by western power formed European identity. This was the result of a need to unite 
against the common enemy coming from the East.4 When Ottoman Turks conquered 
Constantinople in 1453, Pope Pius II remarked: ‘now we have really been struck in Europe, 
that is, at home’.49 As a result of this comment, he would come to be recognized as one of the 
first real Europeans.
The fifteenth century can be regarded as the turning point in ‘European 
Consciousness’. There are several important characteristics, which are worth mentioning in 
order to understand change in the conception of Europe. First, by the beginning of the 
fifteenth century the whole European continent was baptized, therefore the pagan as the 
Other, disappeared. Second, it was the Ottoman Turkish forces advancing into the continent, 
which made Europeans ‘more conscious of their collective identity’.50 The third important 
change is the discovery of the New World by the end of the century. Europe was unable to 
stop the Ottoman threat and turned its gaze to the West, starting the new distinction between 
Europe as civilized and the Other as aboriginal. In Burke’s words, ‘Columbus and Vasco da 
Gama helped the Grand Turk to create European self-consciousness’.51
When Constantinople fell to Turkish hands in 1453, this marked the shift of European 
identity from the idea of faith to culture. As Denys Hay remarks, the Turks confused the 
situation in Europe, and by the time conventional Europe (the lands bounded by the Don and 
the Mediterranean) became all Christian, Turkish powers established themselves in the East 
and started to conquer more of the Christian European lands. He suggests that by this time the
52confusion was resolved by abandoning the synthesis of Europe with Christendom. When the
47 Delanty, Europos Isradimas, p. 57.
48 Delanty, Europos Isradimas. p. 58.
49 Burke, ‘Europe before 1700’, p. 23.
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52 Denys Hay, ‘Europe Revisited: 1979’ (hereafter, Hay, ‘Europe Revisited’), History o f European Ideas. 1, 
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idea of Europe started to change from Christendom to the creation of new forms of 
identification, Europe ceased to be a geographical definition and became a system of values. 
At this time Europe received its cultural meaning, becoming a certain way of life. Of course a 
major aspect of it was still Christianity, but faith was accompanied by an ideology about 
unification against the Ottoman enemy. It can be said that the war with a Turk was not only 
against an infidel, but also against a different way of life, creating an ideological enemy. It 
was a war not only between two competing military powers, but also between two conflicting 
ideologies and competing social, economic, and political systems.54 The Turk received an 
image as a ‘pernicious force sent by God to scourge Christendom of its sins’.55 The proper 
answer of true Christians was to unite and defend their faith against this evil.
However, Europe was not united against the Turk. The religious east-west schism 
persisted. In the year 1458, metropolitan Jonas from Moscow attributed the fall of 
Constantinople to the punishment of God for Greek betrayal of true faith and alliance with 
Latin Christendom.56 The Orthodox Christian Other moved north, and under the rule of Ivan
C 7
the Terrible, Russians overthrew Mongols and started building a modem state. Moscow 
attributed to itself the tradition and seat of Orthodox Christianity and took the offensive 
stance. The rest of Europe became increasingly aware of Russia’s presence in Europe. 
However, with Orthodox Christianity and oriental despotism Russia was more excluded from 
Europe than it indicated.58 But as faith gradually lost its major role and a European way of life 
took its place, it was easier to acknowledge the lands that were formerly regarded as Asian as 
now European. Anthony Pagden summarizes this Russia as somewhere between true Muslim 
Orient and Eastern Europe, sometimes friendly and more frequently a foe, and as having 
many features of European society that were undeniably Christian.59 With or without Russia, 
Europe’s Other was the Grand Turk, and though Europe was never entirely united against it, 
it became the enemy, which increased solidarity.
While the south-eastern border of the European continent was encircled by Ottoman 
Turkey, the eastern part of Europe was identified with resistance to Turkish power and their
53 Delanty, Europos Isradimas. p . 59.
54 Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘The Other in European Self-Definition: an Addendum to the 
Literature on International Society’ (hereafter, Iver B. Neumann, ‘The Other in European Self-Definition’), 
Review o f International Studies, 17, 1991,4, pp. 327-348, (p. 335).
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56 Dimitri Stremooukhoff, ‘Moscow the Third Rome: Sources o f  the Doctrine’, Speculum. 28, 1953, 1, pp. 84- 
101, (p. 88).
57 Delanty, Europos Isradimas. p. 68.
58 Pagden, ‘Conceptualizing a Continent’, p. 46.
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advancement deeper into European lands. The eastern border was the border of containment; 
while western one became expansive. The discovery of the Americas gradually turned the 
identification of Europe from resistance against Islam to extensive expansion in a western 
direction.60 The discoveries of the new world and European triumph in sea navigation 
changed the European mindset. It also added to the belief that Europe had a scientific capacity 
to dominate the world.61 As Burke suggests, in the sixteenth century, Europeans’ reflections 
about themselves were most frequently expressed by the situation in Turkish and American 
lands.62 It became possible to divide Europe according to ideology and occupation. The 
Western part was associated with its colonies overseas while the Central and Eastern part was 
a bulwark against Muslim Orient.
The Grand discoveries also changed the European way of life, creating a mercantilist 
society in Western Europe and societies became commercialized. With a growing sense of 
European superiority, this commercial society gradually introduced transactions, not only of 
goods, but also of ideas, beliefs and habits. The people of commercial society became not just 
mere conquerors, but ‘civilizers’ and moral liberators.64 While encountering other 
civilizations, other lands and continents, the people of Europe became increasingly aware of 
their own European culture. Their awareness, of course was not based on external discoveries, 
these were changes inside Europe. The Renaissance and humanism brought to light the 
philosophical and scientific side of Europe. Man was no longer seen as an obedient, 
anonymous member of God’s mass, he became unique, full of creative and rational capacities, 
an individual.65 This individual was considered sovereign in the world, gifted with reason and 
creative powers, and able to penetrate secrets, creating and inventing things.66 It was not the 
abandonment of religion (God still remained the central figure of the world ); it was the 
questioning of the human world order, the work and art of questioning itself, which changed 
the spirit of Europe. As Denys Hay notes, the first uses of the word ‘Europe’ were in a 
humanist context, such as in the Latin works ‘de Sarmatia Asiatica et Europe, 1518’ by Polish
/TO
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The new spirit of Renaissance and Humanism, and the individuality and questioning 
of the world order gave the European continent the upheavals of uttermost importance. The 
Reformation and religious wars changed the European identity gradually stripping it of 
religious spirit and secularizing the concept. Delanty notes that reformation discarded the idea 
of universal Christian order and opened a space for secular ideas about Europe.69 
Reformation, however, abandoned the vision of Christian unification because Christianity lost 
its territorial identification with Europe and became a religious set of values in rationalized 
form.70 The friction between Humanism and Christianity created the European identity; it was 
based on the ‘Christian humanist myth of man, the vision of a redemptive philosophy of 
history, and the civilizing nature of the new bourgeois value system’, which reconciled itself 
with Christian heritage.71
Though tensions divided Europe as never before, the concept of Europeaness was slow 
to change the old notion of Europe as Christendom. As Burke affirms, the term was 
frequently used in contexts, which had nothing to do with religion. Accordingly, it was often 
used in political contexts until the year 1700, and later the term Europe advanced, but the 
consciousness of being European was rather weak.72 Despite its slow character, it was an 
important change in the European mindset. After several centuries of Christianity’s attempt to 
unite Europe under one banner, it was finally shattered by Humanism and Reformation, 
opening the space for the creation of Europe, which meant something more than geography or 
Christian faith, something that can be identified with, having a strong meaning by itself. In 
Hay’s words, during the seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries ‘Christendom slowly 
entered the limbo of archaic words and Europe emerged for its peoples as the unchallenged 
symbol of the longest human loyalty’.73
The periods of Renaissance, Humanism, Reformation and its Counter-Reformation, 
opened a space for differentiation inside the continent. As Christian identity faded, the 
advance of the Turk, as the Other, was stopped. And though the Ottoman threat remained, the 
Muslim-Christian opposition gradually lost its significance, as did the uncivilized, non­
cultured, and aboriginal. This European was coming from Europe’s west, creating a superior, 
conquering image of Europe, capable of ruling the whole world. This identity shift, however 
gradual, could create differences in Europe, despite the formerly important factor of all
69 Delanty, Europos Isradimas. p. 96.
70 Delanty, Europos Isradimas. p. 97.
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encompassing Christian faith. The concept of Europeaness was (and still is) broad enough to 
encompass classic antique and Christian heritage, while at the same time creating cultural, 
political and economic signifiers. It became possible to differentiate the world on several 
levels and this culminated with the age of Enlightenment.
The achievements of the Enlightenment are summarized in terms of the triumph of 
reason over superstition, custom, and despotism. This is depicted in Kant’s attainment of 
Enlightenment with maturity, saving critical and transcendental powers of reason.74 This more 
empirical, secular and individual reasoning, which started with the Renaissance, reached 
‘provisional completion’75 as the light of reason illuminated the world and man. Louis Dupre 
argues that on a practical level it became the tool of instrumental reason, which led to the 
technical superiority of the West, allowing it to impose its views and politics on most of the
76world, using the powers of colonization and technical and economic advancement.
This also led to a European sense of superiority, making it Europe’s denominating 
factor for years to come. The ever-expanding European dominion overseas and technical 
advancement portrayed the lands outside Western Europe as backward and uncivilized. The 
Orient, besides being Europe’s Other, also received labels as an alien, uncivilized and 
backward area, alongside fictional imagery of luxury, sensuality and lust. It was portrayed as 
inferior to Europe, in need of civilization and conquest. Edward Said attached this Western 
view toward the East to the term Orientalism, describing it as ‘a political doctrine willed over 
the Orient because the Orient was weaker than the West, which elided the Orient'' s difference 
with its weakness’.77
The description, however, was not applied only to lands outside Europe. In a sense 
Orientalism was used to discern between the East and the West inside Europe. It was the Age 
of Enlightenment, which embedded the sense of Western Europe’s superiority over its Eastern 
part. Professor Larry Wolff in his profound study of the mind of Enlightenment claims that 
‘Eastern Europe could be something fantastic, as well as humorous, and above all something 
“invented”, invented by Western Europe’.78 Enlightenment introduced the division of Europe 
according to ‘level of civilization’, which was based on the Western worldview. The
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importance of this action relies on a completely new concept of Europe. It was not 
Christianity or Humanism, it was the political, economic power, employing cultural tools, 
which decided what European was and what was not, and that power was vested in the West 
of Europe. To be European meant to be like the West or to align with it and imitate it. As 
political and economic power started to influence the concept, it was power, which decided 
Europe’s divisions and lines.
The picture, however, is not one-sided. Though Eastern Europe became the lesser part, 
it did not cease to be European. What is more, even the notion of Orientalism is highly 
contested. Western Europe was not merely attaching labels, it was searching for its own
7Qunderstanding. Montesquieu’s ‘Persian Letters’ had most of the labels of Orientalism, but it 
was the comparative element of East and West, which was crucial in showing that there are 
other histories and cultures. It was Montesquieu, who also argued that ‘nations, governments, 
and peoples were the product of their environment’.80 And fictional Persian travellers were 
the ones who, having the opportunity to compare East and West, claimed that ‘the best 
government is that which fulfils its purpose at the lowest cost, and therefore, that the 
government which controls men in the manner most appropriate to their proclivities and 
desires is the most perfect’.81 In his ‘The Government of Poland’, Rousseau repeated this
89idea, stating: ‘that Poles should [...] seek only what suits them’. Eastern Europe served as 
the area suitable for the ideas of Enlightenment, the arena where they could be tested. There 
was no unifying sense about the region as the disagreements of Voltaire and Rousseau show.
The ideas of Enlightenment were adopted by the political powers, which became 
powerful instruments to implement imperialistic policies. The best examples of such political 
thinking occurred when absolutist monarchies re-proportioned the Commonwealth during the 
partitions of Poland. The European card was also used by Napoleon. He created a vision of 
Europe modelled after the French and based on the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the 
ideals of the French Revolution.83 It was also this European card, which was used to create the
84anti-French, anti-Napoleonic and also anti-Western coalition of the Holy Alliance.
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are mainly associated with females, harem, thus supporting W est’s imagery about the East.
80 Andrew Kahn ‘Introduction’ in Montesqieu, Persian Letters, trans. Margaret Mauldon, Oxford, New York:
Oxford Universite Press, 2008, p. xxi.
81 Montesqieu, Persian Letters, trans. Margaret Mauldon, Oxford, New York: Oxford Universite Press, 2008, p. 
110.
82 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Government o f Poland, trans. Willmoore Kendall, Indianapolis: Hacket
Publishing Company, 1985 (herafter, Rousseau, The Government o f Poland), p. 82.
83 Davies, Europe, p . 23.
84Delanty, ‘Europos Isradimas’. p. 105.
22
The French Revolution was an important factor in changing the pattern of Europe. The 
spread of revolutionary ideas freed the spirits of territorial nationalisms, creating republics 
across Europe.85 But it was also one particular French national model with which Napoleon 
aligned himself, transforming it into an imperialistic programme for Europe. Although the 
revolutions and republics were crushed, the nationalistic spirit of revolution was entering 
Europe. So when the Vienna congress system attached the notion of power balance to the idea
O/C
of Europe, the nationalistic interests became the biggest threat to this balance. The concert 
of Europe, sustaining the old system and keeping the powers restrained, was the initiator of 
‘European unity’. Though as Delanty stresses, this unity was negative, it was a balance 
between states, but not unity.87 Nonetheless, it was during the nineteenth century that the 
political ideal of European unity was finally formed. The modem concept of Europe thus had 
its political and cultural dimensions. The cultural portion relied on belief in a universal system 
of values, while the political relied on unity of the power system.88
The power balance was an important aspect of power and wealth accumulation inside 
the empires. The age of industrialization and imperialism was the age of large-scale 
socioeconomic modernization all across Europe. It encouraged the prejudices of European 
advancement and superiority coming from the age of Enlightenment not only against 
European colonies overseas, but also inside the continent. Europe’s Northern and Western 
countries were ahead in the process of economic development, while the East lagged behind. 
Davies expresses the dismissal of Eastern Europe as backward because it was based only on 
economics as the main criterion of civilized life.89 Gollwitzer stated that imperialism can have 
two sides: on the one hand it can be associated with increased participation and the growing 
strength of public opinion; while on the other hand, it presents itself as the coalescence of 
state and economy, as an alliance of power politics with the gains of the industrial 
revolution.90
The expansionist policies of larger European countries trying to keep their power 
statuses fostered increases in armies and navies, which at the core remained narrowly 
national.91 The age of European domination brought doom upon itself, as the balance of 
power could not contain a balance anymore. Imperialistic Europe ended with the First World
85 Delanty, ‘Europos Isradimas’. p . 104-105.
86 Delanty, ‘Europos Isradimas’. p . 105-108.
87 Delanty, ‘Europos Isradimas’. p . 108-110.
88 Delanty, ‘Europos Isradimas’. p. 107.
89 Davies, Europe East and W est, p. 37.
90 Heinz Gollwitzer, Europe in the Age o f Imperialism 1880-1914. London: Thames and Hudson, 1969 
(hereafter, Gollwitzer, Imperialism), p. 194.
91 Gollwitzer, Imperialism, pp. 9-18.
23
War, after which Europe did not regain its power. Though the prejudices of European 
superiority did not disappear, they were adopted a racial concepts, which accompanied later 
reasons for war.
The end of the First World War was the end of the old European idea of civilization. 
Delanty argues that between two major wars it was replaced by the notion of cultural 
pessimism and decadence. Avant-garde and modernism in art and literature were also helping
92to create this identity, which was not associated with nations at war, but with city culture. 
However, the major aspect of European identity after 1918 was its split; Europe was divided 
into two confronting parts: the capitalist West with liberal democracy, against Soviet 
communism. It was also the age of fascist Europe. For example, all fascist leaders starting 
with Mosley and ending with Hitler were willing to create an above-national European 
civilization.93 The Nazi myth, fuelled by the historical spirit of crusades and the Holy Roman 
Empire, was the catalyst forcing fascists to march against bolshevism and against the East.94
The War, which followed the destructive constellation of powers and ideologies, 
ended the system of interwar Europe relying on the principle of national determination. The 
end of the war brought the division of Europe, which was imbedded not only in political, 
economic and ideological opposition between the West and the East, but also the material 
wall built to separate these two worlds. Europe was associated only with the western part. 
Luigi Barzini writing in 1983 complained that:
This tranquil (and unfounded) certainty of many Europeans that their continent 
is already One [...] may also be seen in the fact that people unquestionably call 
“Europe” what is officially and cautiously known only as European Economic 
Community, little more at the present time than a fragile customs union, a mosaic of 
myopic, national, sacred egotisms badly harmonized, that any robust historical breeze 
or a serious economic crisis could easily overwhelm.95
Europe in an alliance with America signified the Western value system as opposed to 
the Soviet system in the East. However, as Barzini concludes, it was far away from the unity 
some imagined, this unity would be decided by the future.
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Barzini encouraged a future that eventually came in the early 1990’s after a string of 
events, including the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the unification of East and West 
Germany and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the re-emergence of a number of 
independent states. Katzenstein and Checkel argue that the eastern enlargements of the EU in 
2004 and 2007 disintegrated the politically cohesive Western Union based of the EU. At this 
time Europe became more diverse and more encompassing. Proclaiming the Europe of the 
Cold War era as anti-communist, this new Europe sought ‘both a place of return and 
inescapable destination’.96 This identity, however, does not encompass the continent. 
Nonetheless, the modem European Union changed European identity from a cultural space 
where frequent political unions happen to a political union of peoples sharing a common 
culture.97
Europe, however, is not and should not become only about the European Union. It 
looks like history is trying to repeat itself, bringing the same problems of exclusion and 
inclusion and narratives about the other and the East and West. However, the idea of Europe 
has changed dramatically. From its geographical determinations, Christian notions, and 
discourse of superiority and racial prejudices and eurocentrism, it tries to incorporate 
elements from the past and look into the future. It is, perhaps, as Bauman expresses: ‘an 
unfinished adventure’, the project of ‘utopian spirit endemic to its identity, a forever not-yet-
98attained identity, vexingly elusive and always at odds with the realities of the day’.
III. Geographical limits and divisions of Europe
No matter how many mythical, historical, cultural, economical or political meanings 
Europe might have, the easiest way to trace the root of these meanings is to leave the 
continent. None of the elements mentioned above, can tmly be ushered aside when a person 
from Europe travels abroad, except the physicality of Europe itself. To leave the continent, to 
move away in a geographical sense, brings to light Europe’s primary spatial meaning. In
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America for example, a person from Poland, France or Italy, when asked where he or she is 
from, will most likely first mention his or her European home country, and if asked where it 
is, he or she will provide its spatial denomination - Europe.
Europe, as a continent, is not easy to conceptualize. It is even more difficult if one 
tries to trace and define its borders over time because these are shaped by the frontiers, lines, 
walls, and divisions, which divide and demarcate the boundaries from what they once were 
and what it is meant to be today. What is more, the borders show what was or is Europe’s 
constitutive Other, or that which lies on the other side of those borders.
At first glance, geographical conceptions such as Western Europe, Eastern Europe, 
East-Central, Central, Central Eastern, Northern or Southern Europe are clear divisions of 
European landmass. However, they have never been simply geographical divisions, and they 
have never been fixed. It can happen that a city, which is more geographically in the West, 
can end up being in the East, while one more to the East might be on the western part of the 
continent (as happened with Prague and Vienna during Cold War divisions).99 Because bodies 
of water surround the western, southern and northern shores, three clear borders of the 
continent exist. It is, however, more problematic to see the eastern shore of the land as a 
demarcation line because it ends up in the Far East, not far from Japan. As G. Delanty 
observes, the Eastern border was never fixed, thus its Northern point was between the White 
and Baltic seas and the Southern one varied between the Ural mountains, the Don river, the 
Caspian, the Aegean and the Black sea.100 In addition, Europe can be perceived as simply the 
peninsula of enormous Eurasian continent, leaving its eastern border open, not only for 
political, cultural or historical, but also geographical ones.
Through the ages Europe has been divided into East, West, North, and south 
geographically, following the political, economic and cultural developments there. Even 
without a physical map it has always had a mental one. On top of physical geography, 
imagined geographies are often placed. Geographies, which were described by J. Hagen as 
‘referring to ways of perceiving spaces and places, and the relationships between them as 
complex sets of cultural and political practices and ideas defined spatially, rather than 
regarding them as static discrete territorial units’.101 Europe’s inseparability from imagined 
lines and borders evokes a sense of its structural uniqueness. In other words, one can draw
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and redraw its lines and formations, resulting in the construction of new meanings and 
identities. This is, as Sebastian Munster’s ‘Europa Regina’, shows: geographical 
understanding is also a constructed one, and imagination can turn Europe into something 
beautiful (and powerful) not unlike a queen.
3.1. Europe: borders physical
The geographic understanding of Europe begins with ancient Greece. For Greeks this 
understanding meant the physical division of the world into three parts, including Europe. The 
other divisions consisted of Asia and Africa, the two other known continents at the time. As 
Mark Bassin asserts, it was easy to separate Europe from Africa because it was divided by the
1 09Mediterranean Sea, and Asia was separated from Africa by the Nile River. The European- 
Asian border, however, was not clear. Greeks knew about the waterway provided by the 
Aegean-Black Sea, but the lands in the North of the Azov Sea were ‘terrae incognitae’.103 
This three-fold continental division of the world was also facilitated by medieval scholars and 
remained an important geographical representation until the late Middle Ages. Medieval T 
and O maps illustrate this division perfectly, which has even lead to such artistic works as 
Bunting’s (1545-1606) clover-leaf map of the world. Though Bunting already knew of the 
Americas and created ‘proper’ maps, his creativity reminds one of the importance imagination 
plays in the construction of the world. This is use of imagination was also employed in 
constructing the eastern border, which divided Europe from Asia.
The Greeks had already ascribed the Tanais (Don) River as the border of Eastern 
European, but its sources and exact flow were a matter of fantasy, sometimes making Russia a 
mere isthmus and the Don comparable to the Nile.104 But Greeks understood Europe in 
geographical terms, they rarely identified themselves with Europe, leaving Europe as a 
geographical concept and imposing the distinction between Us and Them as between 
themselves (Greeks) and the rest.105 Medieval geographers retained the same European 
continental borderline as well. This was an important division, fixing eastern limits of the 
continent for a thousand years at the frontier of Don. But, as occurred in the late Middle Ages,
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the conception of Europe moved from being geographical, dependent upon the physical 
continent towards the ideological and cultural idea of Christianity.
The eastern border began to divide, not only the continents, but also civilizations, 
lifestyles and religions, making everything in the East: non-European, alien, and oppositional. 
The border gained its new distinction, however, as powers from the East frequently had parts 
of the geographic European continent under their rule. It became more mental than 
geographical. For some, as the division between western and eastern branches of Christianity 
intensified, Europe was only encapsulated by the lands under the western part of the religion, 
leaving Orthodox Christianity on the other side of the border. This had little geographical 
reasoning. The invasion of Tartars and their subjugation of Muscovy, as well as the 
advancement of the Turks from the South-East reinforced this tendency.106
In the medieval ages these considerations formed the question of Russia’s 
inclusiveness or exclusiveness within Europe. The Muscovite State, which emerged after the 
end of the Tartar subjugation was considered barbarous and backward, thus placing it along 
the same lines as Turkey, and ultimately denying Russia’s Europeaness.107 And ‘for centuries, 
at least from the western point of view, the frontiers between Sweden, Poland and Austria on 
the one hand, and Russia and Turkey on the other, formed the eastern boundary of the 
European community’.108
Muscovites, themselves, did not have much interest in recognition of their 
Europeaness. Ideologically they ascribed themselves to Orthodox Christianity, following the 
doctrine of Moscow as the ‘Third Rome’ and they imagined themselves as the exclusive 
bearers of true Christianity. Europe, for Muscovites, carried a classical meaning pertaining to 
physical divisions between the continents. The first geographic works followed this division, 
accepting Tanais (Don) as the boundary between two continents. Pre-Petrine Russia, deriving 
its scholastic tradition from classical teaching, ignored the fact that Tanais (Don) divided 
Muscovite State into two parts, which spatially ended up on two different continents.109
During the sixteenth century Western European geographical knowledge of Russia 
increased, and what was previously considered a narrow isthmus was actually a wide 
broadening from Europe into Asia. The Don was then found to be too small to be a boundary 
between the two continents. However, an agreement for placing a better border between the 
continents was never achieved. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, several lines
106 Parker, ‘Europe: how far?’, p. 280.
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were proposed as the boundary110; Ob line won a wide acceptance. The rapid Muscovite 
expansion elevated questions concerning boundaries to the political level. Taking into account 
that the border of Muscovite Russia changed too fast to be represented properly on western 
maps, Russia became the border country, sometimes included and sometimes not in the maps 
of Europe. Of course this also had to deal with the changing prescription of Europeaness, 
which moved from religious to cultural grounds. In the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries 
western knowledge was too scarce too make a strong decision regarding the inclusion of 
Russia in Europe, accordingly when ‘they embrace at least part of Russia, there is notable 
difference between the detail of the maps on either side of the Russo-Polish frontier. To the 
west the maps, the maps there filled with minute detail; eastwards their nature changes 
abruptly; there is little detail and most of the space is filled with symbolic forests’.111
The situation changed when Peter the Great came into power and declared European 
ideology within Russia. Russia became an empire, which like all European empires could be 
divided into two parts: (1) homeland or metropolis (located inside European civilization) and 
(2) colonial periphery (located outside).112 Oscar Halecki suggests that it was at this point that 
the imperialistic and conquering nature of the new Russian State forced its way into Europe 
through annexation of more western lands. Peter the Great annexed the Baltic territories, 
emperors Catherine II and Alexander I connected the Russian empire with Europe through 
purely European territories- the bulk of Poland and what was formerly Swedish Finland. From 
a political perspective the ‘Empire was now definitely a part of the European state system, 
and it was obvious that from the eighteenth century European history cannot be written 
without including the whole foreign policy of Russia’.113 However, Russian imperial 
conquests were the most rapid away from Europe- deep into the Asian continent. As Russia 
became part of Europe, largely associated with the new imperial European order, the border, 
which could divide the continents, was questioned because it became the line that divided 
Russia into two parts. Russia’s eastern frontier was not suitable, as it was in F. J. Turner’s 
words a ‘Moving Frontier’.114 The main distinction regarding Russia’s moving frontier, 
however, was that it did not have any attraction and ‘often transplanted, the different groups
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of Russian society were less rooted in a specific region or locality than the various orders of 
minutely articulated old European society’.115
State-encouraged migration and political deportations into Siberia caused no spatial 
attachment, making the eastern lands superficially settled and requiring emancipation from 
the European centre, leaving them eastern and non-European. The common acceptance that 
Russia had its two parts, European and Asiatic, was meaningless as long as there was no 
acknowledged boundary between these two parts. During the rule of Peter the Great, the 
prominent spokesman and ethnographer V. Tatishchev proposed the Ural Mountains should 
be the boundary between Europe and Asia.116 Similarly, the Ural Mountains were suggested 
by Swedish officer P. J. Strahlenberg, who was taken as a war prisoner during the battle of 
Poltava117 and had to spend the Great Northern War in Siberia. By the end of the eighteenth 
century, Strahlenberg’s Ural boundary was confirmed in Russia, especially after it was 
supported in 1771 by another scientist, Peter Pallas, who was invited to Russia by Catherine 
the Great. In the early nineteenth century the Ural boundary was introduced in France and 
Germany,118 and as it was emphasized by N. Davies,119 this ‘conventional and quite arbitrary 
boundary’ became the frontier of Europe for more than 200 years. But as professor Davies 
also argues, ‘there is no reason to think it is eternal’.
Even though the physical frontier of Europe was established, it never solved the 
problems associated with Russia’s non-European character. There were several boundaries 
proposed, which were largely connected to ideological and political estimations. Russia had 
its own ideological currents of westerners, slaphoviles and eurasians, who continued to argue 
for the exclusion or inclusion of Russia in Europe. In addition, the post-revolutionary Russia 
and the Cold War system brought new considerations about Russia’s political exclusion from 
the European state system. However, these images are more connected to political and 
ideological patterns of European history and the division between Europe’s East and West, 
therefore they must be considered in a more general context of mental boundaries inside the 
European continent.
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3.2. Europe: divisions mental, walls material
The year 2009 is remembered in Europe for several reasons. Probably the biggest 
issue was the economic downturn, though the European Parliamentary elections and the 20th 
anniversary of the fall of Berlin Wall should also be mentioned, as they had coverage around 
the world and had special meaning for all European countries. The Berlin Wall, the product of 
human construction, was one of the most important divisions inside Europe, partitioning it 
into the East and the West. Although the wall was a physical construction, it was a political 
result of the human mind, becoming an impenetrable division. However, the Berlin Wall was 
not the first or the last division of Europe. Historically, divisions have been mentally 
constructed and cultural and political backgrounds were connected with geographical maps, 
ascribing to cognitive borders the geographical terms of: East, West, and the Centre.
The first of these dividing lines come from when the concept of Europe was 
established as a geographical continental division in Ancient Greece. At this time, the Greek 
frontier was based on civilization’s opposition to the barbarian Other. Greeks discerned 
themselves from the Other, whom they could not understand. This division also retained its 
importance during the years of the Roman Empire. The line was physically embedded in a 
stone wall named Limes Romanus. In his geo-ethnic model Stein Rokkan suggests that this 
was an important point of further centre-building and peripheralization on the European 
continent expressed by the Empire’s movement westward and north, conquering lands until 
the Rhine and Danube were reached. The same can be said about later invasions of Germanic 
tribes during the fourth and fifth centuries, Arab conquest into Iberia, Viking raids in the tenth 
to eleventh centuries, movement of Slavs and Finno-Ugric peoples into German lands, and 
eastward expansion of Germans from the twelfth century.120 According to S. Rokkan, these 
movements and waves of conquest, formed four sets of ethnic groupings along a west-east 
gradient: the Atlantic periphery (Celtic and Basque lands), Western coastal plains (heartland 
of early seaward kingdoms - Danish, Anglo-Saxon, Frankish), Central Plains (heartland of 
German-Roman Empire) and landward periphery (the Slavs, Magyars and Finns caught in 
cross-pressure between German and Swedish Empire-building forces). These west-east slices 
were divided by Rokkan into three distinct layers from north to south: (1) lands beyond the
120 Stein Rokkan, ‘Territories, Centers, and Peripheries: Toward a Geoethnic-Geoeconomics-Geopolitical Model 
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reach of the Roman Empire (such as Ireland and Poland), (2) imperial lands north of the Alps 
(such as England, France and Hungary), and (3) Mediterranean lands, most heavily affected 
by Latin institutions and least affected by Germanic invaders.121 Rokkan’s Central Plain and 
landward periphery distinction, recognizing Roman influenced Germany and Part of Germany 
outside the Limes, became an important division for centuries to come. Although the 
divisions never exactly coincided with the Limes, especially during the Cold War, Germany’s
division into two parts was accepted as the frontier between the East and the West in
122Europe. The Napoleonic frontier alongside the Rhine was one of such repeated Roman 
frontiers throughout European history.123 However, Limes Romanus were not the main driver 
of European divisions, the German eastern conquest and the formation of new centers and 
peripheries after the collapse of the Roman Empire caused fiercer and more salient divisions. 
According to Rokkan, the lands, which were under Roman rule developed a ‘city belt’, which 
created many centres and there were difficulties in establishing one that was superior to all the 
others. It became easier to establish such core-areas at the edges of the ‘city-belt’. The first 
wave of such centre-creation was on the ‘coastal Plains to the West and the North’ (France, 
England, Scandinavia, Spain), the second wave took place on the landward side (Habsburgs, 
Eastern March of the German Empire and later Prussia).124 ‘The fragmented middle belt of 
cities and petty states were the scene of endless onslaughts, countermoves, and efforts to 
reorganize during the long centuries from Charlemagne to Bismarck’.125 The Frankish 
Carolingian Empire was an attempt to unify this middle territory re-establishing the Roman 
Empire. However, the division of empire in 843 was of major importance, as the middle part 
(Lotharingia) became the ground of quarrel and conquest between the empire’s former 
western Frank and Eastern parts, which formed the Holy Roman Empire. The two core­
centres during their state building processes made a ‘loose middle part’ as their clashing point 
and marginalized it at the same time.126 Stein Rokkan calls these lands ‘interface peripheries’, 
as ‘they were caught in the cross-fire between dominant centers and were never fully 
integrated into either of the blocs’127 One of such periphery was the extensive German-Czech
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interface in the Sudetenland and the German-Polish interface, which pushed as far as the 
Lithuanian border.128
Rokkan’s interface conception is important in the context of the formation of the 
Central European region. On a larger scale the historic lands of Bohemia, Poland-Lithuania 
and Hungary were captured between major cores of German and Russian origin, resulting in 
several divisions during the history. The Prussian, Austrian, and Russian powers managed to 
incorporate these lands into their empires during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
forming the imperial system of Europe, which culminated in the Congress of Vienna. These 
developments also formed the Habsburg-Hohenzollem frontier, and later the German- 
Russian frontier, resulting in the two bloodiest European wars. These divisions show the 
importance of the lands lying at the centre of the continent.
Sir Halford Mackinder runs his dividing line of Eastern and Western Europe, much 
like the Roman Limes line, from the Adriatic to the North Sea, leaving the Netherlands and 
Venice on the western part and Berlin and Vienna on the eastern, ‘Prussia and Austria are 
countries which German has conquered and more or less forcible Teutonised’.130 He attributes 
the key element of Eastern Europe to German aspirations of dominance over Slavs. 
Mackinder’s division of Eastern and Western Europe receives its importance because it
131coincides with his strategic division of Heartland and Coastland. Thus Eastern Europe is 
part of the Heartland, and gains power from access to the Heartland and opposition to sea- 
power (controlled by Western Europe). Mackinder also describes the strategic importance of 
not allowing any power to conquer Eastern Europe, showing that this was the goal of the 
Russian and German powers.132 All of these divisions show that besides several divisional 
aspects, be it the Greek and Roman civilizational-barbaric frontier, the political and economic 
frontier between Eastern and Western powers or the Periphery-Centre distinction, the centre 
was never united for a long time (although there were several attempts throughout history) 
and rather served as the area of Europe’s inside divisions and frontiers.
Geographically the external limits of the European continent rely on agreement and 
their physical frontier is not a natural division of the continent. As M. Lewis and K. Wigen 
contend, ‘viewing Europe and Asia as parts of a single continent would have been far more 
geographically accurate, but it would also have failed to grant Europe the priority that
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Europeans and their descendants overseas believed it deserved’.133 The internal divisions and 
frontiers in Europe formed several regions inside Europe itself. These historical regions have 
formed areas of Western Europe, Eastern Europe and lands in-between them. This central 
territory, which was never united under one banner for a substantially important time, with its 
own divisions and non-homogeneity, led Oscar Halecki to divide Europe not into two parts, 
but into four: Western, Eastern, West-Central and East-Central Europe.134 All of these partly 
physical, partly imagined geographical spaces were interconnected during European history, 
leading to the (trans)formational nature of the concept of ‘Eastern Europe’.
The situation changed then Peter the Great came into power and declared European 
ideology for Russia. Russia became empire, which as all European empires could be divided 
into two parts: homeland or metropolis, located inside European civilization, and colonial 
periphery, which was outside it.135 As Oscar Halecki suggests, it was at this point that 
imperialistic and conquering nature of the new Russian State forced its way into Europe 
through annexation of more western lands: Peter the Great annexed Baltic territories, 
emperors Catherine the Great and Alexander I connected Russian empire with Europe trough 
purely European territories - the bulk of Poland and what was formerly Swedish Finland. 
‘Politically that Empire was now definitely a part of European state system, and it was 
obvious that from the eighteenth century European history cannot be written without 
including the whole foreign policy of Russia’.136 However, Russian imperial conquest was the 
most rapid towards the opposite direction of Europe - deep into Asian continent. As Russia 
became part of Europe, largely associated with the new imperial European order, the border, 
which could divide the continents started to be questioned, because it became the line, which
divided Russia into two parts. Russia’s eastern frontier was not suitable, as it was in F. J.
i ■j'l
Turner’s words ‘Moving Frontier’. However, the main distinctiveness of Russia’s moving 
frontier was that it did not have the attraction: ‘often transplanted the different groups of 
Russian society were less rooted in a specific region or locality than the various orders of
1 T O
minutely articulated old European society’. The state-encouraged migration and political 
deportations into Siberia caused no spatial attachment, making the eastern lands superficially 
settled and requiring emancipation from the European centre, leaving them eastern and non-
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European. The common acceptance that Russia had its two parts - European and Asiatic - was
meaningless as long as there was no acknowledged boundary between these two parts.
Already during the rule of Peter the Great the prominent spokesman and ethnographer V.
1Tatishchev proposed Ural Mountains as the boundary between Europe and Asia. .Similarly 
Ural Mountains were presented by Swedish officer P. J. Strahlenberg, who was taken as a war 
prisoner during the battle of Poltava140 and had to spend the Great Northern War in Siberia. 
By the end of the eighteenth century Strahlenberg’s Ural boundary was highly confirmed in 
Russia, especially after it was supported in 1771 by another scientist, Peter Pallas, who was 
invited by Catherine II. In the early nineteenth century the Ural boundary was introduced in 
France and Germany141 and, as it was emphasized by N. Davies142, this ‘conventional and 
quite arbitrary boundary’ became the frontier of Europe for more than 200 years by now. But 
as professor Davies also notices, ‘there is no reason to think it is eternal’.
IV. Divisions Cultural: Eastern Europe as (un)Civilized
Nearby, Saint Ann’s church In Vilnius, which is built in gothic style of architecture, 
one will find the Orthodox Cathedral of Theotokos, built before Christianization of Lithuania. 
The division of two cultures, based on religion would run so easily in this place. One standing 
between St Anne’s and the Cathedral of Theotokos could chose one instead of the other, 
pointing to gothic style naming its similarity with gothic style across Europe (so, Western 
Europe), or pointing to cathedral showing its similarity with the Greek Orthodox style (so, 
Eastern Europe). However, Vilnius never was the city of grand culture of Europe, it never had 
enough power. And it is the power which matters, it can make city more eastern or more 
western and churches would stand beside each other ignored by the division or will confirm it.
Cultural aspect of Eastern Europe is of crucial importance, as it employs human 
senses. But culture itself is rather complicated concept. It is more complicated to deal with it 
in the case of Europe, as Europe itself plays a cultural role. What is more, Europe, as Z. 
Bauman points out, not only discovered/invented culture, but also invented the task of
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culturing culture.143 The culturing culture, of course, goes with a mission of civilizing. It finds 
the subject which needs to be cultured and during the implementation of the mission cultures 
itself. As Z. Bauman stresses ‘in its European rendition, “civilization” (or “culture”, a concept 
difficult to separate from that of “civilization” despite the philosophers’ subtle arguments and 
less subtle efforts of nationalists politicians) is a continuous process -  forever imperfect yet 
obstinately struggling for perfection -  of remaking the world’.144 This civilizing perspective 
bears another crucial argument made by Z. Bauman: it is simply ‘allergic to borders’145; 
Europe is a civilization of transgression.
This ‘heroic deed’ of civilizing was as much internally directed as externally. It was 
about Europe’s cultural other - Barbarian, Muslim, Aborigine, Indian - needed to be cultured. 
But also it included the dimension inside, the important one, helping to address the questions 
of Enlightenment to physical space - Eastern Europe. As L. Wolff stresses, for the rise of 
civilizational discourse Eastern Europe served as a ground for identification and affirmation 
for Western Europe during the age of Enlightenment.146 By inventing Eastern Europe, 
Western part invented itself. The Enlightenment ‘put all its most important concerns on the 
line to deploy and develop them in Construction of Eastern Europe: the nature of the man, the 
relation of manners and civilization, the aspiration of philosophy to political powers’.147 In 
other words, the mind of Enlightenment invented Eastern Europe, which had to be everything 
what Western Europe was not.
However, cultural history of Europe (East or West) neither started nor ended with 
Enlightenment. Byzantine world and its successor Muscovite state was the cultural other 
inside Europe from the Great schism onwards. Nonetheless, it was always culture of 
Christian, meaning European. Pope Pius II, writing in the fifteenth century regarded Russians 
as Europeans, as they were bearers of Christianity.148 But this view was not universal. 
Russia’s contested space in Europe or outside it complicated the situation (as it was 
mentioned, Don river as the boundary between Asia and Europe divided Russia, complicating 
the situation till the ages of Catherine the Great). Rebelais in 1500 held Russians as 
unbelievers, lining them with Persians, Indians and Troglodytes.149 The travelers’ tales
regarded Russians as barbarous and fit for slavery. The discourse usually employed the term
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Scythians, referring to the Ancient Greece, where Scythians meant barbarians, as it is known 
from Herodotus. Such travelers as Captain John Smith (crossing the continent from England 
to Ottoman Europe and taken prisoner by the Crimean Tartars in 1603) and Adam Olearius 
(traveling in 1630 with German commercial mission from the Court of Holstein) described 
their experience of meeting the locals as most barbarous people.150 Olearius described 
Russians as lacking ‘good manners’, and ‘fit for slavery’, they ‘lusts of the flesh and 
fornication’ were accompanied by ‘the vile depravity we call sodomy’.151 The description of 
Russia was similar to that of Muslims. What is more the issue of Russia was even more 
complicated, because it’s permanent contact with non-Christians.152
Russia’s contested place in Europe represented the larger debate of Eastern Europe’s 
Otherness, emphasized and formed during the Enlightenment. The right to decide about 
inclusion or exclusion, however, was left to those travelers, geographers or philosophers 
themselves.153 It was the discourse, which was important, the Otherness, which was crucial, 
but the decision was never clear and Eastern Europe never became Europe’s Other. It was 
rather a space for Enlightenment projects. It was the space, where ideas of Enlightenment 
could be tested, clashed one against the Other, praised and denounced at the same time. That 
is why Jean-Jacques Rousseau could address Polish on a political matter of the state formation 
as a people able to form the enlightened state and society: ‘Without being an expert on Polish 
affairs I should bet anything that your Diet is the place to look for enlightenment, and your 
dietines the place to look for virtue’.154Voltaire, who engaged in a correspondence with 
Russian Empress Catherine the Great, and praised her civilizing mission towards conquered 
non-enlightened nations, during the French-Russian conflict, could declare that ‘it is the 
Tartars who are polite, and the French who became Scythians’.155 He praised empress as ‘the 
first person of the Universe’ able to ‘humiliate Ottoman pride with one hand, and pacify 
Poland with the Other’.l56 Earlier defined as a land of ‘barbarians, lacking good manners’, 
Russia was able to become the land of Enlightenment. Eastern Europe was a land of 
possibilities, the land capable of civilization, the land for and of Enlightenment.
However, the question of culture, although applied on the East-West axis, was an 
invention of Enlightenment. Before Peter the Great, one would hesitate on inclusion of Russia
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into Europe. It was Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on the Eastern borders of Europe, and 
the lands of Central and Eastern Europe were not the lands of the cultural East. Renaissance 
and Reformation moved not East, it moved from South to North.
Professor Denys Hay asserts that it was North-South cultural contacts in late Middle 
Ages, which turned Italian Renaissance into European Renaissance through the sixteenth and 
the seventeenth centuries.157 He stresses the astonishing homogeneity, which was reached in 
European art of the fourteenth and the fifteenth century, represented by ‘international 
Gothic’.158 That is the reason of similarity, of spires reaching for the sky across Europe. While 
the eastern rim of the continent was identified with Ottoman rule in Balkans or Tartar yoke in 
Russia, these lands did not belong to European cultural movements. Renaissance, humanism, 
reformation were the upheavals of Latin Christianity, despite the East or West spatiality.
J. P. Amason comments that with the coming of international Luxemburg dynasty into 
Bohemia and making it the basis of Imperial authority, it brought one of the most significant 
‘cultural upgrading in the region’159 Prague of Charles IV is a splendid city, one of the 
European centers of humanism and Renaissance. Its peak, according to J. P. Amason, is the 
Husite movement, which ‘can be seen as a forerunner of later upheavals in the West, 
beginning with the Reformation’.160 He stresses that the influence of Renaissance and 
humanism brought East Central European regional centers closest ‘to being on equal footing 
with the West’.161 While the Western part of the continent was devastated after the Hundred 
Years’ War and Great Plague of 1348, most of the Poland was unaffected enjoying splendor 
of Renaissance and cultural uplift. During the reign of Kazimierz the Great (1333-1370), 
the university of Krakow was founded (1364) following the Charles University established in 
Prague (1348) and preceding the University of Vienna (1365), the influx of refugees from 
Western Europe (including fleeing Jews) brought merchants, bankers and artisans, rebuilding 
the cities and placing Poland on Renaissance and European cultural maps. The Polish cultural 
life prospered not only on regional level. The late Renaissance was a tremendous peak of the 
Polish and European mind, science, and cultural connection. As A. Zamoyski notices, it was 
‘Kingdom of Erasmus’, referring to the letter of Leonard Coxe who, after teaching at
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Cambridge and Sorbonne, came to Jagiellon University, and wrote to his friend that ‘Poles 
walked, talked, ate and slept, Erasmus, beginning with the King, who wrote to him in a 
familiar style’.163 It was such works as Copernicus’s ‘De Revolutionibus Erbium Coelestium’ 
or Jan Kochanovski’s ‘The Dismissal of the Greek Envoys’ and J. Zamoyski’s Platonic city - 
New Zamosc164 which made Poland the land of culture.
However, the cultural advance of Polish Kingdom and later Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth evolved into Sarmatism and closer contact with Oriental style, which in the 
eighteenth century looked so alien for Western Europeans. It was economic and political 
constellation, the second serfdom and szlachta Republic, with its Sarmatian ideology and way 
of life which changed country picture. Sarmatism was the ideology and culture of the nobility 
from the end of the sixteenth century until twilight of the eighteenth century deriving from the 
myth that Slavs originated from Sarmatians, who lived in the early Eastern and Central 
Europe.165 The Sarmatian way of life was accompanied by exaggerated gestures, attire and 
rituals, clothing, which included a lot of eastern elements and theatrical ceremonies.166 The 
lesser nobility had their own distinctive costume, culminating with Turkish-style outer cloak; 
and mustache was as necessary as much as shaven head.167 Although enormously rich upper 
nobility (magnateria) was highly educated, followed Frenchified fashions and participated in 
cultural life of Europe, it was a general picture of the country, which, with the coming of 
Enlightenment, labeled it backward and uncivilized.
4.1. Eastern Europe in the mirror of the Enlightenment
That is why Louis-Phillipe de Segur traveling trough Eastern Europe when entering 
Poland exclaimed that, ‘one believes oneself to be leaving Europe completely; everything 
might give the impression of retreating ten centuries in time’.168 His notices on szlachta’s 
living conditions were no better: ‘a great number of horses, and almost no furniture; an 
oriental luxury and none of the amenities of life’.169 This picture, however, is one-sided. To
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exclude Poland from the processes of Enlightenment would be lack of insight. Polish 
‘oswiecenie’ (Enlightenment in Polish) as R. Butterwick notices ‘was a religious metaphor 
already deeply rooted in Polish culture. Between 1760 and 1790 the word was largely, but not 
entirely secularized, and it continued to be used mainly in that secular sense for the next two
170or three decades’ . Enlightenment in Poland is highly associated with the last king - 
Stanislaw Augustus Poniatowski - reigning from 1764 till 1795. His active personal 
involvement and employment off ‘all the means in his disposal’171 to spread the 
Enlightenment was crowned by creation of Commission of National Education in 1773. The 
major trends of Polish enlightenment were vested in fight against superstition propagating 
learning, which by ‘combination of reflection, observation and meditation led to discovery of
1 72truth’. In a few cases, ‘oswiecenie’ acquired a status comparable to Aufklarung, as an 
autonomous force acting within history in opposition to the forces of ignorance, superstition
1 71and fanaticism. Mme Geoffrin, who ran the most famous Enlightenment salon in Paris, 
visited Stanislaw Augustus in 1766. This event received a wave of fascination and mockery, 
but was the most important encounter of Enlightenment ‘proper’ with Eastern Europe till 
Rousseau wrote his ‘Government of Poland’, where addressing Polish people he declared: 
‘Your Frenchman, your Englishman, your Spaniard, your Italian, your Russian, are all pretty 
much the same man <...> when the Pole reaches the age of twenty, he must be a Pole, not 
some other kind of man’.174 Poland’s difference and exceptionality could be as much the 
object of praise and fascination as of ridicule and comedy. Nonetheless, it was part of 
European cultural picture of the time.
Economically, of course, Eastern Europe was backward, Poland with its vast lands, 
bad roads, forests and marches, was a land of barbarians compared to lively and booming 
Paris. Eastern Europe was a society of decline, scanty population and bad living conditions. 
Lady Mary Wortley Montagu writing in 1717 depicted that ‘nothing can be more melancholy 
than to travel through Hungary, reflecting on the former flourishing state of that kingdom, and 
to see such a noble spot of earth almost uninhabited’. And it was economic picture with 
meant so much on distributing the labels of civilization and culture. However, Eastern Europe 
changed its character, when Poland ceased to exist by the end of the eighteenth century. The
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political power distribution in Europe, which after Napoleonic wars culminated in Vienna 
peace system, emphasized the power axis, which ignored East-West divisions. As Robin 
Okey notices, it was Saint Petersburg, Stockholm, Copenhagen and Berlin, ‘with Warsaw in 
uneasy limbo’, which were regarded as ‘northern courts’, and Tsar’s victory against 
Napoleon, liberating Europe was coming from the North.176 Even the travelogs depicting the 
backwardness were concerned with ‘improvement of manners’, emphasizing the advance 
towards common European civilization: ‘titles reflected patrimonial assumptions or a sense of
177shared urbanity rather than cultural polarities of east-west or other regional divides’ . The 
political power concentrated in Vienna, Berlin or St. Petersburg contested the East-West axis 
forming the system based on military and political influence disregarding regional divides and 
putting reliance on a center’s control over periphery. The eighteenth-nineteenth centuries saw 
the rise of Absolutist systems, and these had their own Enlightenment programs. At the 
begging of the eighteenth century the Habsburg Austria, Hohenzollem Prussia and Romanov 
Austria were societies and states lagging behind industrialized West. Their choice was
178‘Enlightenment from above’ turning to secularization and centralization of the state. L. R. 
Johnson noted that it was not the ‘homegrown philosophers’, but monarchs, who were the 
best representatives of Enlightenment in Central and Eastern Europe in the eighteenth
179century, turning towards France for example and inspiration.
In the eighteenth century Habsburg Enlightenment denounced its former pompous 
baroque cultural structures indulged in a French ideas and fashions, loosening the Jesuit 
control over the education and importing new ideas of natural law, dismantling baroque’s 
formalism and engaging in academic pursuits.180 The revitalization of society brought the rise 
of bureaucracy, army, trade and industry, turning the state towards the path of 
industrialization and economic catch-up program with more advanced Western societies. 
Nevertheless, the Absolutist Enlightenment had different dynamics than the West influenced 
by philosophers. It did not create the liberal democratic ‘revolution from below’, which 
happened in Western societies and dismantled old feudal systems, increasing middle class, 
seeking for their political and economic freedom.181 However, the Enlightenment discourse
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itself suggests the grand stories of improvement, civilization and world-changing ideas. But if 
one turns the gaze towards the lands possessed by imperial powers, the particular micro­
history suggests of local scale Enlightenment, as T. S. Bmardic suggests with an example of 
Bohemian capital.182 It was not only the Enlightenment ‘from above’, but also individual 
projects on the local scale, which, according to T.S. Bmardic, could be simply the ‘quest for 
improvement’.183 Despite the fact that the status of Prague was reduced to provincial city, its 
own infrastructure of theaters, libraries, academic institutions, book and printing shops 
provided the conditions for local philosophers, who can be described as enlightened patriots 
working for ‘improvement of Bohemia and the happiness of its people’. Their actions and 
discourse were based on the local level, differing from the grand narrative of Enlightenment. 
Nonetheless, they show that Enlightenment does not have to be exceptional prerogative of 
major countries as France, Great Britain and Germany.184
Enlightenment was crucial with bringing up label of backwardness for Eastern Europe. 
The vocabulary it used forming East-West antithesis of barbarism and civilization, wildness 
and urbanization, bad and good manners, associating it with fantasies, lust, slavery and 
possession as well as possibility of cultivation. As Larry Wolff concluded, it created the 
cultural division preceding the Cold War, introducing the cultural artifice, which is still
1 RSsalient today supporting the culturally constructed division. Though Central and Eastern 
European monarchies took from the Enlightenment ideas, which gradually became the engine 
of their centralization and development, it was the cultural backwardness, highly based on 
economic underdevelopment of the region, which in a combination with the mind of 
Enlightenment formed their policy of possessing the region. Ideas of the Enlightenment 
provided the ideologically useful discourse of the ‘civilizing mission’, which central 
monarchies undertook.
4.2. Complexity of cultural environments
The civilizational narrative of Enlightenment received a blast from romanticism. Its 
major concern was the sphere of spiritual human experience, shifting human mind and 
experience, which ignored Enlightenment’s method of reason. According to N. Davies, the
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movement’s beginning at the end of the eighteenth century, even received labels of Anti- 
Enlightenment and Pre-Romanticism.186 The new movement shifted the cultural life in Europe 
towards individual’s senses and suffering with Goethe’s literary masterpiece ‘The Sorrows of 
Young Werther’.187 Romantics and the following age of nationalisms brought the concern 
about particular nation and its advancement ignoring regional divisions, however, not 
forgetting the power relations and oppressors. It was Eastern Europe, which was under the 
rule of Imperial powers, where nations found themselves oppressed and waves of 
revolutionary strives took place. The people living in this region found themselves under the 
plethora of identities. Larry Wolf, commenting on Leos Janacek and modem opera in central 
Europe, stressed that overlapping traditions made it possible to identify Janacek’s work with 
‘Moravian, Czech, Slavic, Habsburg, East-European or Central operatic modernism’.188 
Though modernism usually is associated with urban metropolises, Janacek found its 
inspiration and worked in provincial town of Brno, he worked in a cultural context of local, 
municipal, regional, provincial and imperial identity formations making his work 
transnational and overcoming the boundaries, signifying the complex range of cultural
1 RQenvironments which embraced Europe before the First World War.
The complexity of cultural environments mirrored the complex political situation in 
Europe, where the concepts of Mitteleuropa, Pan-Slavism, Imperialism together with national 
movements were present. The nineteenth century Europe’s Imperialistic aspirations, the 
narrative of the leading role in the world (sometimes pushing for white master race 
domination) formed the relations of power and influence, which did not have borders. It was 
the historic time of national glories for powers or national upheavals for oppressed ones. The 
Russian case had its specificity as emerging movement of Slavophilism. It argued against 
Russia following the western patterns of development, while Westemisers advocated the 
political and cultural models of Europe.190 However, as O. Halecki191 stresses, it is important 
to discern the third cultural-political mind of Eurasist’s, which emerged in the nineteenth 
century. The vast Russian empire, stretching from Europe to Asia, had a mixture of cultural 
trends of Slav-fratemity and Asiatic mission.192 The invention of Eurasian continent and 
trends of Russian exceptionalism again raised the questions of Russia’s inclusion or exclusion
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from Europe. Dostoyevski wrote that for Russia it is necessary to annex Asia: ‘It is necessary 
because Russia is not merely a part of Europe but also of Asia, because Russian is not merely 
a European but also an Asian, because our hopes, perhaps, are centered more In Asia than in
193Europe. Nor is that all: Asia will prove the outlet for our future destiny’.
The whole twentieth century saw several modes of cultural change. Europe, shattered by 
the First World War, became weaker on a global scale, and though it saw the rise of the free 
nations and states, it remained divided on the line of democracy and totalitarian regimes. The 
belief that Europe is based on certain norms and values like democracy or tolerance was 
opposed towards disastrous culture denying the value of an individual.194 The states of East- 
Central Europe, backed by the policy of protectionism, turned inside national cultures and 
sentiments, resulting to nationalistic and authoritarian policies. With and exception of 
Czechoslovakia, authoritarian regimes arose in East-Central Europe; the hard-to-cope 
modernity brought the transformative totalitarian powers escalating resentment and flaws of 
democracy. The socialist revolution, which transformed Tsarist Russia into Soviet power, 
meant its ‘moral and spiritual withdrawal’195 from Europe. The whole Europe, engulfed by 
cultural pessimism, economic crisis and outcomes of war was experiencing the same 
devastating upheavals and unable to unite, fell into disastrous tendencies of non-democratic 
solutions in order to seek for revenge or implement the one vision of Europe. Culturally the 
whole continent was experiencing the same traumatic post-war experience: the line between 
East or West could be drawn on borders of Soviet Union as well as the borders of 
authoritarian states, which would encompass the large portion of European centre. Another 
great war of the century ended dividing Europe clearly into two halves of East and West. 
However, it has to be noted that the first post-war-year intelligentsia did not exclude 
communism- it was ‘exotic in locale and heroic in scale’.196 Besides the political Iron Curtain 
the cultural life in Europe was split into Communist and their friends and anti-communists. 
However, in Western Europe Soviets were rapidly losing ground and after the 1956 revolution 
in Hungary most European intellectuals turned away from Soviet model.197
The major cultural difference in East and West of Europe was based on intelligentsia’s 
role. Zygmunt Bauman argues that in the Eastern half revolutionary intelligentsia was 
inseparable from the state, linking power and economic leadership trough spiritual leadership
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1 Q 8of intelligentsia to the domination of communist party. It led to the party-controlled civil 
society, meaning that intelligentsia was denied the authority in realm of civil society.199 It was 
either the state controlled culture or conflict with the state. Eastern Europe did not have the 
public sphere, which could belong to civil society, thus experiencing the pressure to 
incorporate and assimilate the intellectual practices into the officialdom of the state.200 The 
absence of free culture may be marked as the line between East and West of Europe. 
Nonetheless, the 1960’s brought the two halves of Europe close enough on the mass culture of 
consumption.201 The intellectuals in the East and West of Europe saw the modernity based 
consumerism as mass cultural power embracing the continent with its devilish consequences.
It is culture, which created Eastern Europe during the Enlightenment, which probably is 
the first to abandon the distinction. The today’s global, modem world unified the cultural life 
across the continent. Tony Judt argues for the unprecedented ‘Europe as a way of life’, where 
audiences from Barcelona to Budapest as well as the material on offer are strikingly
909uniform. The cultural uniformity started by the turn of the twentieth century, when cultural 
life was dominated by urban, industrial culture and all-pervading presence of the 
technology. It let A. J. P. Taylor describe it as the age of the town hall, railway station and 
opera house, the age when traveling across Europe was easy, opera theaters had the same 
repertoire and people were wearing similar clothes. 4 The situation, which after the two 
major wars and major political and economic opposition of the Cold War and decades of 
traumatic exclusions, can be seen again. Except that opera theatre must be changed to cinema, 
railway station to the airport and clothing style must be similar as never before, based on 
labels and brands. How much of this cultural pattern is European in this global world is not 
easy to say, though one thing is certain - Europe lost its privileged position of cultural 
superiority, which was created during the early modem period. It is no more about the East or 
West of Europe, but more and more frequently about all-encompassing European culture.
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V. Eastern Europe: Political Formation(s)
In 2009, the Latvian ambassador to Denmark made a remark on the ‘EurActiv’ blog 
concerning an article about political instability in Eastern Europe caused by financial 
downfall in Europe. However, his remark was not about the economic situation in Latvia, but 
about the regional orientation of the country. He wrote, ‘I think that it is not very precise to 
describe my country as a part of Eastern Europe. Latvia, like Finland and Sweden, is part of 
Northern Europe. Besides, she is a member of the EU and NATO’. He continued that there is 
a ‘fundamental difference’ between Latvia and countries like Ukraine or Georgia and ‘to 
disregard these fundamental differences is simply an illustration of old, Cold War-style 
thinking’.205 From these beliefs, represented by the ambassador as the official representative 
of the country, one can state several important points, and though the main message states that 
Latvia is not in Eastern Europe, the other part of the message is more worrying. It is this 
‘fundamental difference’ between East and North (or the rest), which is most unpromising, 
that is precisely part of the Cold-War style thinking, which the ambassador encourages others 
to avoid.
It is true that the Cold-War system clearly divided Europe into Eastern and Western 
parts. Therefore, one may have believed that there is, or should be, fundamental differences 
between these two parts. These had to be found in political, economic, and ideological 
systems clearly separated by the Iron Curtain. However, the Curtain is no more, and one 
would like to believe that, maybe, there is no fundamental difference anymore as well. But it 
is not easy to avoid using the vocabulary attributed to and by the countries in (or out) of the 
Eastern European region. The narrative about the East is still influenced not only by Cold- 
War style thinking, but also by thinking from the ages of Enlightenment and Imperialism, 
bearing the remaining message of backwardness, geographical borderland, periphery and 
‘lesser civilization’. It is not the fault of the Latvian ambassador that he has to deal with a 
situation and wording provided by the narrative itself, so the decision to exclude Latvia from 
the region seems like a best solution. The decision made exactly by the same means - the 
politics - which made Latvia part of Eastern Europe not so long ago. The political decision to 
be in the European Union and NATO is presented as a safeguard against its past inclusion 
former in the ‘East’. Political projects of inclusion and exclusion are the ongoing experience 
of the whole of Europe. There was never a line drawn to divide Europe, be it cultural,
205 http://euractiv.blogactiv.eu/2009/02/17/ambassador-andris-razans/ [accessed 10 May 2010].
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geographical or economic, which did not have a certain political message. And the Cold-War 
line is neither the first nor the last, but it is the most recent.
5.1. Early formations
It is hard to speak about European political divisions, since Europe itself was not a 
political concept until the eighteenth century, but the regional developments, which could 
emphasize the differences between one part and the other, can be retraced from the beginning 
of state-formations. Oscar Halecki, presenting the history of East-Central Europe, discerned 
that from the very beginning, the moving Slavic tribes formed three distinct groups, which 
had different historical destinies. The eastern branch, later known as ‘Rus’, was exposed to 
relations with Asiatic invaders, while the western and southern Slavs were barely affected by 
them during the prehistoric period. The western and southern branches of Slavic tribes, 
however, were affected by the Germanic tribe movement. It was this movement, which was 
directed westwards towards re-conquering the lands taken by Slavic tribes during their 
migration.
The Germanic movement became too aggressive and powerful for Slavs living near 
the western borders of their homeland to resist bringing them into close contact with the 
Roman tradition and the Catholic Church.206 So it was, according to Halecki, that:
In a contradistinction to the Eastern Slavs who had to face semi-barbarian 
Asiatic invaders, mostly pagan, the Western Slavs had to realize that they could not 
resist their opponents without themselves entering the realm of the Roman culture 
which was the main factor of German superiority, and most important, without 
becoming Christians like their neighbors.207
It was Europe of Charlemagne and Carolingian Empire, which through consolidation fused 
barbarian and Roman legacies and formed the distinction between the domains of the former 
Roman Empire and newly added lands as the first possible distinction between Western and 
Central Europe.208 From this point, the distinctive region that found itself ‘within
206 Halecki, Borderlands, p. 26.
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civilizational orbit but beyond imperial borders of the emerging West’,209 became neither east 
nor west and received the name of East-Central Europe. As J. P. Amason suggests, it was a 
time when the Eastern name was reserved for more far-away powers such as Kievan Rus.210
The early Kievan state was also trying to fuse the Antiquity of Byzantines and 
Barbarism of Russians.211 However, this process was stopped by Europe’s west, alienating 
itself from the Byzantium and Mongol invasions, which divided and subdued Kievan Rus.212 
Jeno Szucs argues that one can talk about the regions of Europe after the turn of the 
millennium, when Occidents transformed Western Europe and Byzantium abandoned 
‘defensive rigidity’. The two powers turned north absorbing the intermediate, 
heterogeneous region. As the division between these two powers became the one splitting 
Europe (especially after the great Schism), it separated East Slavs from West Slavs by the line 
running through the lower Danube and Eastern Carpathian regions, reaching the Baltic area in 
thirteenth century.214 Europe and at this time Christendom, was split into two parts based on 
the influences of Rome and Byzantium. This split is visible by the Romanesque and Gothic 
architecture, the phenomena of Renaissance and Reformation, and the border of the historic
215Kingdoms of Poland and Hungary. The patterns of region formation on the East-West axis 
started with these differences during the Middle Ages. The Tartar conquests sealed Russia 
from Europe, thus leaving the area in part of Christian Europe under alien rule.
In the Balkan area, according to Denys Hay, the disrupted unity provided by emperors 
is comparable to the fall of the German Empire in 1250.216 It was the preservation of a 
common language and loyalty to the emperor in the nineteenth century, which inspired the 
unification of Germany. In the Balkans, however, linguistic differences accompanied national 
sentiments and encouraged the Greek kingdom to separate into the separate states of Albania, 
Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania.217 But this disruptive unity in South-Eastern Europe was 
crucial for the Ottoman advancement, which was stopped in the Hungarian kingdom. Political 
differences during the Middle Ages left Eastern Europe under foreign suppressive absolutist 
rule and the West experienced the rise of corpus politicum from the long lasting crisis of
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diverse feudal self-interests. The situation in the West formed a relationship between rulers 
and the political sector of society, which was institutionalized in the order of estates around 
1300.219 The difference, which Oscar Halecki defines as catastrophic for Europe, was the 
Turkish conquest of the Balkans and the Tartar invasion, completely alien in cultural terms;
990the Asiatic domination in the region ‘left an indelible imprint on the Russian character’.
The time of region formations also left the lands in between the historic kingdoms of 
Bohemia, Poland (later Poland-Lithuania), and Hungary, which were under western influence. 
Though Western structures could be detected, they were incomplete (towns) or overgrown
22 i
(nobility). It was these structures, which made the region of East Central Europe 
recognizable during the Middle Ages. There, ‘modifications to the structure of the Western 
type of models and norms could be detected in almost everything’.222 It was the 
‘disproportionately wide stratum’ of nobility in East-Central Europe, which soon gained 
political influence and became aware of its power that blocked ‘ascending themes of local
9 9 0
legality’. J. P. Amason asserts that during the medieval and early modem periods the three
994historical states were closest to creating a pure form of estate order. However, nobility did 
not want central power to gain influence, as it did in the West. According to Jeno Szucs, the 
West was exhausted by civil wars and nobility expected the state to provide military and
99Ssafeguard their privileges. Thus it led to the fonnation of great estates in East-Central 
Europe and economic arrangement of providers for the West - the second serfdom. The region 
together with Eastern Europe tied the burden on peasantry.226 This later led to economic 
backwardness in the whole region, where the peasantry and the free towns withered.
When Europe was surrounded by Turkish power from the South-East, and Eastern 
Europe was under the lordship of Tartars, European civilization ended with the Polish- 
Lithuanian border. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish Kingdom later joined in the 
Commonwealth, forming one of the largest territorial entities in Europe at the time. Their 
territorial gains served as important factors in Polish and Lithuanian European conscience 
formation, and they were seen as the European frontier of western values and Christendom. 
Because it was such a huge territory, it was very geographically near to non-European powers
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or Europe’s Other - the powers coming from the East, alien to European-Christian 
civilisation. As P. S. Wandycz argues, ‘no wonder that historic...Poland, bordering on 
Muscovy and the Ottoman lands, regarded themselves and were regarded by others, as the 
bulwark of Christendom (antemurale christianitatis). Their eastern frontiers marked the
• 997frontiers of Europe’. The best representation of these ideals is the incredible relief of 
Vienna from the Turks, led by king Jan Sobieski in 1683. But by the time Sobieski led the 
battle against the Turks, Eastern Europe was rising in power alongside Muscovite Russia. The 
growing power, which loosened itself from the rule of the declined Golden Horde, turned to 
the West and marched into Europe, conquering Polish-Lithuanian lands.
The Russian rise led to Norman Davies symbolic claim that ‘the Muscovite army 
marched for the West in May 1500, and in a sense, did not stop marching until 1945’.228 It 
became the power, which could not be excluded from Europe. With Peter the Great and his 
‘window into Europe’, the Russian power became indiscernible from the European power 
balance. The power of Russia and its revisionist attitude toward the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth was based on the doctrine of the Third Rome, sketched by Abbot Filofei of 
Pskov in 1510, where he described Moscow as the follower of Rome and Constantinople and 
the only remaining sanctuary of Orthodox Christianity.229 The theory justified both the 
government’s creation of a strong centralised state in the autocratic hands of the tsar and the 
creation of an empire led by Moscow, in order to protect Eastern Christians and colonise and 
Christianise the territories in the East.230
5.2. Political oppositions of the twentieth century
The growing imperial powers in the West had a lot in common in the sense of state 
centralisation, growth of the army and bureaucracy and protectionism in the economy.231 
However, the absolutist state in the West ‘was a compensation for the disappearance of 
serfdom’; while in the East ‘it was a device for the consolidation of serfdom’.232 It was the 
political order of empires in Europe, based on centre-periphery relations, which politically
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ignored the East-West axis until the early nineteenth century, when masses claimed the voice 
of public life and nationalism turned to cultural differences.233 The growth of centralised 
imperial powers in the West and East of Europe was decisive for the region of East-Central 
Europe. With the last partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1795, the whole 
area was won by imperial powers. As Oscar Halecki clarifies, the western German section of 
Central Europe came into direct contact with Russian Eastern Europe for the first time in 
European history.234
The new situation affected the whole continent, and the fonner power-balance was 
disrupted, moving the two powers toward the centre- Russia from the East and France from 
the West. It was the Austrian chancellor, Mettemich, who proposed the idea of ‘Mitteleuropa’ 
as a counterweight to Russia and France.235 Mitteleuropa, however, was received negatively 
by East Central Europe, as the German-Austrian alliance meant German rule over the nations 
and states of Central Europe.236 However, in the late nineteenth century, most educated 
Germans believed Mitteleuropa was economic and not a political concept, even adopting this 
view toward the neighbouring Slavs and portraying them as economically backward. This 
also justified the potential for domination, though being of questionable worth to bother 
about.237
New national movements created tension between German ruling ideas and national 
interests. The beginning of the twentieth century saw regional economic modernisation and 
co-operation, by which Friedrich Naumann sought to elevate Mitteleuropa as a central 
European world power.238 The whole of the nineteenth century can be marked in Robin 
Okey’s words as the age of ‘sacred egoism’, when none of the cross-regional tendencies (be it 
economic Mitteleuropa, the pan-Slavic movement or the Polish looking beyond Central 
Europe towards France and advocating an Europe of the people) prevailed. The East Central 
European states struggled for their national independence alongside problematic state creation 
processes. It was the First World War, which changed the situation.
In 1915, the future president of Czechoslovakia declared that the goal of the war was
239to ‘regenerate Europe”. According to him, after the war the new order in Europe would be 
created, which would employ the principle of self determination and could finally correct the
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injustices of the imperial period, which created the ‘prison of nations’.240 However, the post­
war era was marked by ideological divisions in Europe and with the exception of 
Czechoslovakia, democracy did not root itself in all of East Central Europe, causing 
authoritarian regimes to spring out. The two major ideological opponents, Germany and 
Russia, found the Successions states to be ‘buffers erected against them on its behalf.241 
Soviet Russia in the East was regarded as European, but it was a ‘somewhat errant’ part of 
Europe.242 However, it must be noted that though Russia was perceived as a threat, the real 
opposition came with Cold War discourse, and the pre-war belief of threat from Russia is 
often contested.243
In the case o f Central Europe, Weimar Germany first directed the revisionist policy 
against Poland, while Hitler pursued the whole of East-Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, 
Austria and Czechoslovakia became his initial targets.244 In 1939, German unity in Central 
Europe and its influence in East Central Europe repeated its hegemony, and the line 
separating western and eastern zones of occupation in Germany and Austria resembled the 
German-Slavic frontier of the early Middle Ages.245 The interwar Europe, that of the 
Versailles system, though based on the defensive alliance of France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia and Romania against Germany and Hungary, was not united enough and too 
fragile. Germany, and later Russia, used ideological and psychological manipulation, as well 
as profound politico-demographic and socioeconomic weaknesses and conflicts within East- 
Central Europe to regain the control246 over the area. The outcome of World War II was 
exactly the one Halford J. Mackinder warned against. He proclaimed that the power trying to
947organize the resources of East Europe and the Heartland was neglected by the Soviet 
power, which had all of East Central Europe under its sway.
When Churchill called for European unity, he meant the unity of the West, Europe 
was worn out and ready to forget not only its previous grievances, but to acknowledge the
248division, thus putting the Iron Curtain between Europe’s East and West. Norman Davies 
argues that the period was the most influential in reinforcing the negative image of Eastern
240 Katzenstein, ‘European Identity’, p. 121.
241 Okey, ‘Cetral/Eastem Europe’, p. 120.
242 Neumann, Uses of Other, p. 101.
243 Neumann. Uses of Other, pp. 101-102.
244 Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, Return to Diversity: A Political History o f  East Central Europe 
Since World War II. 3rd eds. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000 (hereafter, Rotchild, Return 
to Diversity), pp. 2-3.
245 Cahnman, ‘Frontiers in Europe’, p. 620.
246 Rotchild, Return to Diversity, p. 5.
247 Mackinder, ‘Democratic Ideals’, pp. 98-99.
248 Katzenstein, ‘European Identity’, pp. 124-125.
52
Europe. It was the confrontation of the ‘Western World’ with the United States of America 
and ahead of it with the Soviet Bloc, which separated two parts letting people live in those 
two parts with ‘little direct contact’.249
Europe represented only the western part, associated with European Economic 
Community or the European Union, and the social sciences reaffirmed this division, 
suggesting its permanence.250 It was against this policy of ignorance and forgetting, that 
intellectuals coming from the Eastern Part launched their criticism. Their major argument was 
against the division of Europe into two parts, through reviving the notion of the centre of 
Europe. This, according to J. Hagen, ‘served as a direct challenge to the Soviet, or Eastern,
251system of cultural and political suppression’.
Kundera argued for the cultural legacy of the Habsburgs and moral and cultural 
aspects of Central Europe, rather than geographical ones. However, in his version of Central 
Europe, Kundera did not include Germany (East or West) and denied the Soviet Union as part 
of the European region.252 His vision of Europe had the centre, but did not have the East. The 
concept of Mitteleuropa also saw attempts at renewal, serving as a geopolitical tool to 
challenge Soviet hegemony and the West’s apathy.253 Mitteleuropa, advocated for German 
reunification and was skeptically received in the region because of its association with 
German expansionism and economic imperialism.
By the end of the 1980’s, a distinction between Mitteleuropa and Central Europe was 
made. As Hungarian writer Gyorgy Konrad explained, Central Europe was ‘made up of small 
nations between two large ones: Germany and Russia’.254 However, the collapse of the Soviet 
system changed the policies of centre revival into policies about the ‘return to Europe’. The 
central spaces were seen as ‘intermediate stages in an effort to deconstruct the East and return 
to Europe’. There was a will to name the country ‘Central European’ in order to give it 
‘Western credentials’ and differentiate it from the East or Balkan. As J. Hagen argues ‘it 
was the rhetorical device helping Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians redefine themselves as 
Western and therefore the leading candidates for membership in the EU and other Western 
institutions’.256
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5.3. Not yet fully European
Does the change of political systems in Europe’s East after the collapse of the Cold 
War system and Eastern EU accession mean that Eastern Europe moved further East? The 
viable Visegrad Group is one of the political and economic concepts uniting states in East 
Central Europe, challenging their former label of the East. However, the most important 
political goal, at least in East Central European states, after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, was the return to the West. In other words, the integration to capitalist systems and the 
creation of westem-style democratic institutions, which would be followed by integration into 
the EU and NATO were the most significant.
But the whole process of integration, as Merje Kuus contends, had a double framing. 
The politically incorrect discourse of opposition by Europe to Eastern Europe was changed by 
EU enlargement discourse, stemming from changes to the tenu ‘Europeaness’ and 
differentiation between fully European ‘Europe’ and not-yet-fully European ‘Eastern 
Europe’.257 The EU and NATO enlargements, which collapsed much of the former Cold War 
division, introduced a new division: the European core and Central European applicants that 
are not yet fully European.258 This framework does not challenge the East-West dichotomy, 
but advocates alignment with the right side, while at the same time feeding into Eurocentrism 
and perpetuating the dichotomy of Europe and Russia.259
The newest political developments on the European continent have changed the 
patterns of being Eastern and Western, though the distinction did not disappear because 
concepts about the post-communist area are still widely used, it is now mostly based on 
economic differentiation, not politics. It is the association of Europe with the European Union 
or European Economic area, which now creates more problems and divides Europe into two 
zones. Eastern Europe could become the Eastern rim of the EU, while Russia could be 
excluded from the continent entirely, or Eastern Europe could be made up of all countries 
outside the European Economic area (excluding EFTA). With the Cold War division now 
fading, Europe has a new opportunity to unite itself, leaving the labels of East and West only 
to spatial determination.
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VI. The Socio-Economic Development: the Periphery of
the West
The division of Europe between East and West when turned into economic terms 
usually shows the apparent differences: wages, GDP numbers, living conditions are speaking 
against Eastern Europe in comparison with patterns in the West. This situation can be retraced 
from the sixteenth century till the economies based on socialist or capitalist systems. Eastern 
Europe in economic terms was always a lesser, backward, peripheral part. It is tempting to put 
the whole development of the area into Wallerstein’s theoretical framework of capitalist- 
world economy. His division of the world economic system in core, periphery and semi-
7 ft 0periphery, based on the degree of the profitability of the production processes fits the 
division between Western Europe as a core and Eastern as a periphery. Wallerstein’s division 
is associated with the new division of labor, which started in the sixteenth century. In the core 
area, towns, merchants, industries flourished, moving towards variety of specialization; while 
the periphery was a producer of primary products for exchange for the manufactured ones, the 
towns were weak and agricultural pattern of economy prevailed moving towards 
monocultural trend261. However, Daniel Chirot stresses that it is important to make a 
distinction between the causes of East European backwardness, which theory could put into 
the world economic system, and the influence of the system itself. Eastern Europe did not 
become backward because its peripheral role in Western Europe’s development, but it became 
dependent on the West262. Wandycz presents views that it was not the agrarian capitalism, 
which caused regions backwardness, but the backward structure, like weak domestic market. 
It is also incompatible with empirical evidence (for example England did not import any grain 
and occasionally exported itself)263. What is more, Eastern Europe was not economically 
homogenous area. The differentiation between Center and East can be made. Bohemia, for 
example, was indistinguishable from neighboring Bavaria and Austria and despite its political
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subjugation never became the state of dependent backwardness.264 Also western Poland and 
Hungary, because of the close contact with the West, was economically more advanced than 
more backward agricultural economy of Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine or Moldavia prevailing 
into the twentieth century.265
Ivan T. Berend attributed certain socio-economic characteristics to the region. Its 
distinctiveness is the historical trajectory as a constant, repeated attempt to catch up with 
Western Europe (especially from the nineteenth century).266 This tendency comes from the 
Middle Ages. As Robin Okey suggests, despite the lower density of population in the Eastern 
part of the European continent the steady demand for skilled labor from the West shows the 
economic and cultural lag with a desire to catch up.267 Although the rapid town-building in 
the late medieval ages shows the growth, these towns never turned into ‘money-makers’ in 
Western sense. The feudal forces did not let to strengthen the economic power of bourgeoisie. 
The nobility, which owned large estates primarily used for grain export, used their noble 
privileges and powers to reduce the influence of towns. Nobility usurped the regulation of 
market prices and objected the bourgeois representation in the diets, thus stopping the process 
of town-growth, which by that time was in the West268. Okey argues that ‘deprived of trade 
with the West and a peasant market, the East European town withered - in one Polish town 
only 28 per cent of the houses that had existed in the mid sixteenth century remained in 1811 - 
and noble dominion triumphed over stagnant society’.269 The situation led to the so called
970‘second serfdom’, which was consolidated by the seventeenth century. Wallerstein explains 
it as different consequences of the recession, which encompassed Europe in the fourteenth 
and the fifteenth centuries. In the West the outcome was the crisis of feudal system, while in 
the East it led to ‘manorial reaction’ culminating in second serfdom271, the process also highly 
emphasized by Jeno Szucs. The whole region became provider of the raw materials (mainly 
grain) to the West, which was profitable for nobility, willing to maintain system unchanged. 
However as François Crouzet notices, exports of the grain to the West were instrumental in
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the rise of the second serfdom.272 The dependency of East on the West, may not be the main 
cause of second serfdom, but it certainly was profitable for the landowners.273
The sixteenth-seventeenth century economic initiatives were scarce, relying on force 
majeure and trying to preserve the position rather than trying to develop the economy.274 
Although François Crouzet stresses that before the industrial revolution differences in per 
capita incomes between European countries were not large275, the major failure of the region’s 
socio-economic system was its inability to adapt the modem changes. Ivan T. Berend’s 
stresses that, ‘between the fifteenth and the nineteenth centuries, the region could not follow 
the rise of the modem, merchant, industrializing Western capitalistic core, with its 
homogenizing absolute states. Instead it became the raw material and food-supplying 
periphery, re-feudalized in the capitalist world system. Until the mid-twentieth century, this 
region remained agricultural Europe’.276 Differently to the West, where bourgeois society 
started to dominate, numbers of peasants started to decline and working class to grow, in 
Eastern Europe a ‘dual society’ dominated. The old noble elites and middle class gentry with 
immense number of oppressed peasants lived alongside relatively small number of modem, 
mostly non-indigenous, German and Jewish elite and a small working class, which learned to 
co-exist in this non-adaptive and backward society.277
The rise of centralized imperial powers and their conquest of the region were, 
paradoxically, beneficial in economic terms. Western Poland benefited from the market of 
Gennany, as well as Bohemia from industrial investment coming from Austrian Empire.278 
The Russian part of Poland was favored by opened Russian market, which brought cheap raw 
materials and was a huge consumer of Polish-Lithuanian production. The modernization 
programs brought by enlightened absolutisms were vehicle for economic development in the 
politically oppressed region. For example, compared to slow modernization of Russia, Polish, 
Baltic and Finish parts of the empire, were examples of progress; because of their highly 
developed social-educational environments and better entrepreneur traditions these lands 
profited from Russian modernization more than Russia itself. The common market and 
abolition of internal tariffs in 1851 opened marked for exports, letting the Polish Kingdom to 
rise as the third largest industrial centre of empire. Per capita industrial production was twice
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that in Russia.279 The level of industrialization in former Poland-Lithuania was much higher 
than in empire as a whole. Of course, the major engine of this growth was consuming Russian 
market.
Despite modernization programs region still preserved agricultural character and still 
had relatively undeveloped domestic markets. Berend evaluated the structural changes only 
reaching the medium level.280 The gap between the West was narrowed, but Eastern Europe 
was still far away from catching up.
6.1. Protected nationalistic markets between the wars
The war undoubtedly brought destruction and ruined the pre-war economic 
achievements in the region. But war also brought the independence; braking from the empires 
newly emerged states identified their national independence with self-sufficiency. Their 
economies for the following decades were marked by constant struggle to overcome war 
devastations, economic nationalism, high tariff walls and replacement of imported goods with 
domestic production.281
The economic exhaustion, shortages and chaos brought by the First Word War 
haunted the region for several years.282 Berend notices that it was not only high rates of 
inflation, ceased exports and economic chaos which faced new countries, but also structural 
economic crisis -  ‘the demanding requirements of long-tenn adjustment to an age of new
283technology’ . The states were trying to cope with short term economic troubles, but the long 
term adaptiveness mattered more and had the greatest impact in the future.
East-Central European countries employed national economic policies, which turned 
from the path of free trade. Their national economies were highly connected to nationalistic 
ideas and attempt to create economic independence. The major tool to achieve these national- 
economic goals was protectionism.284 The protectionist policies also embodied an effort to 
change traditional European division of labour - East Central European countries refused to 
be exporters of food and raw materials.285 However, these states remained the importers of 
manufactured products from industrialized West. In order to overcome this situation they
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employed import-substituting industrialization, which was enhanced by the security of 
protected domestic market, the backwardness of the region was used to stabilize the economic 
situation by inner-consumerism and substitute of imports by rapidly growing industry. The 
protectionist policies in the region and the whole continent worsened the economic situation 
as East-Central European states lost their major imperial economic markets.286
Another outcome of the First World War - the revolution in Russia and creation of 
Soviet Union saw a rise of the socialist economic system. Soviet Union first employing the 
New Economic Policy, which was mixed, later turned to planned command economy. Its 
major features - industrialization and collectivization made Soviet Russia the third industrial
287power in the World. It, however, was isolated from capitalist Western Europe, remaining 
non-important in Europe’s foreign trade performance.288 The costs and measures of Soviet 
economic policy, causing massive migrations, famine, creation labour-camps and deaths of 
millions were of course based on totalitarian system, nevertheless, economically state 
advanced, as numbers show the GDP from 1928 till 1940 almost doubled.289
Although the industrialization in East-central Europe promoted light industries and 
countries recovered from war devastation and even reached short term economic success, the 
promoted industries of East-Central Europe already started to decline in the West. As Berend 
names it, the ‘fourth industrial revolution’, based on innovative sectors with new branches of 
engineering and electrical industry were absent from the economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe. This lack of technological-structural adjustment left countries in the peripheral 
position in the international economic system (with an exception of Czechoslovakia).290 
Although nonagricultural share of labour grew fast, countries could not liberate themselves 
from agricultural character.
After temporary boom came another devastating blow to the economies of East- 
Central Europe - the Great Depression. Because of their agricultural character countries in the 
region had relatively undisturbed development of consumer-goods, which helped to 
counterbalance the crisis. It was not the industrial decline, relatively mild in the region, which 
caused the economic destruction. Their agricultural character caused them to suffer even more 
than the West. Berend distinguished three major characteristics of the Great Depression: ‘the 
unusual depth of the agricultural crisis and its consequences for the balance of trade and
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payments; the devastating debt crisis, insolvency, and impact on trade; and the lack of ability 
to adjust to the technological-structural challenges of the crisis’.291 The price decline of 
agricultural products and burden of the debt sank the region into economic turmoil. Their 
inability to respond adequately to the challenged brought by technological transformation 
‘determined the long-term destiny of the area by conserving its peripheral status in Europe’.292
The relative success reached during the first decade after the war in East-Central 
Europe was destroyed by the Great Depression. Countries turned to revolutionary means 
bringing fear and turmoil. Ever contrasting political groups employed revolutionary political 
struggle marking the beginnings of future war. The unsuccessful attempt of protectionist 
policies ended up with Nazi occupation and terror in the region. The devastations of the war 
could not be countable. War and political disorder combined with internal social upheavals 
and Soviet force marching from the East to the West shifted the profiles of governments in the 
region from the extreme right to the extreme left.
6.2. The Soviet economic model
The Second World War turned into ruins the achievements of economy reached after 
the First World War. From the ruins of economy the soviet model of industrialization was 
risen, promising better life and so desired catch-up with the West. Countries of East Central 
Europe launched the program of enforced industrialization in the framework of Stalin’s 
socialism and dictatorship. ‘The Soviet bloc, its institutions, ideology, and cultural politics 
hermetically sealed off from the West, thus used a state socialist, anti-humanist model to 
combat its historical backwardness. It withdrew from Europe in order to catch up with and
• 9 293surpass it .
The cornerstone of the soviet economy - central planning, was accompanied by strict 
control and harsh punishments. The economy was over-bureaucratized, regulations were 
introduced constantly to overcome the undesired effects of central planning.294 Foreign trade 
with capitalist countries, both ideologically and politically, was undesired, thus promoting the 
new regional framework - Council of Mutual Aid, which fulfilled the requirements of 
centrally planned economies. Fixed prices, which were so advantageous for planning,
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introduced after Korean War and a planning mechanism let the East Central European 
countries ‘to concentrate resources and development on centrally chosen projects, to an extent 
unknown before. Thus it seemed to be a promising system for rapid industrialization, with a 
uniquely high rate of industrial investment and growth’.295 This brought so desired 
industrialization to the backward European East.
The post-Stalin era brought development of welfare institutions and created modest
296consumer societies. The slowdown of industrialization turned investments towards 
agriculture increasing its productivity, also contribution in services and infrastructure had 
risen from one-third to half of all investments297. This meant better housing, transportation 
and communications. The distinctive feature of post-Stalinist socio-economic development 
was relatively high level of social services298: healthcare, pensions and social assistance 
encouraged the consumption creating the image of prosperity. It created the same consumer 
society, which according to East-Central European intellectuals like Czeslaw Milosz and 
Václav Havel brought East and West closer (though in a disguise of was felt brought East and 
West closer ‘into a modem malaise of consumerism and the lies it concealed’.299
The reached goals of modernization transformed the former backward society. The 
most rapid growth in the history of the region led to a breakthrough.300 Berend uses Bairoch’s 
calculations pointing that ‘for the first time in its modem nineteenth-and twentieth-century 
history, [Central and Eastern Europe] was able to halt its relative stagnation or decline 
compared with the other European countries, and narrow the gap between them and the
301Others'. However, as the time passed the soviet regime found it more and more difficult to 
catch up with ‘modem modernization’, which emerged during the second half of the twentieth 
century in the advanced world. After breakthrough in 1970’s, the region gradually turned 
from catching-up to lagging behind performance.302 New competitive and modem branches of 
economy based on high technology industries did not emerge in the region. The story of non­
adjustment to new structural challenges brought by the world market repeated itself The non- 
flexible soviet economy sank into stagnation and gradual depression. The economy and 
politics collapsed bringing the great transformation and dissolution of the Soviet Union. With 
the end of communism independent democratic governments emerged. They found
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themselves in a declining, bankrupt economy: ‘the situation was characterized by stagnation 
spanning a decade and a half, a decline in GNP and deterioration in the standard of living, 
inflation, indebtedness, and insolvency, and most of all, a hopeless structural crisis and lack of
303adjustment’. The countries again found themselves on a periphery of the modernized West. 
The situation received a name of ‘detour from periphery to periphery’ by Berend, evaluating 
the economic performance of Eastern Central Europe during the second half of the twentieth 
century.
6.3. The economic transformation and European integration
The political transformation in the East Central Europe and chosen democratic path 
was accompanied by the economic transition. New governments had to take the road of 
privatization, marketization and up-to-date modernization. The move towards laissez faire 
economic re-structurisation was followed by closure of obsolete uncompetitive sectors 
resulting in decline of production, increase of unemployment and deterioration of living 
conditions.304
Reforms triggered structural adjustments. The basic private initiatives were major 
movers of economic growth together with the rise in previously neglected and 
underdeveloped service sectors305. The foreign direct investments started to play the important 
role in region’s economic development. Foreign investors were the major creators of modem 
industrial branches in Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia and the Baltics.306 
Although the differences in the region are visible, the western rim of the East Central Europe 
managed to integrate their markets into system of the world market.
In 2004 East-Central European countries (also Malta and Cyprus from the South) 
joined the European Union, having reached 45 percent of Union’s income level.307 The 
genuine modernizing changes transformed their economies: developed services, decline of 
agricultural workforce, enhanced communications, opened the floodgate to the West.308 In 
2005 Berend predicted that ‘in 20 to 30 years, successful economic development at one and a
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half or two times the speed of the West, may finally lead these countries to catch up -  a 
process which has been attempted many times in modem history and has repeatedly failed’.309 
Does that mean that the region finally escaped from “vicious cycle of economic 
backwardness”? The answer tends to be positive, as the structural change is obvious, the 
recent financial crisis showed the region’s economy is highly integrated into the world market 
and that is its main achievement, which must be its major advantage in the future.
However, only the western rim of Eastern Europe managed to integrate their politics 
and economy into the West. Ukraine’s more oligarchic politics and economy are highly 
influenced by Russian factor and Belorussia is in backward half-soviet, half-market economy, 
with discernible authoritarian character. It must be said that economically the region is highly 
diverse and there is no common area, which economically could be assembled under one 
cohesive label of Eastern Europe.
VII. Eastern Europe and Historiography
Writing history is never as innocent as it might look from the first sight. Historian 
rarely gives just a bare fact, but describes the event or action, which happened in a past. No 
matter how truthful might be the fact, the historical interpretation is always the work of the 
human historian. What is more, history can cover a particular aspect: it can be economic 
history, political history, cultural history, history of arts, and history of a person or a tiny 
aspect of one’s life. It also can be wide in scope or tiny, tracing the detailed - history of one 
thing or action. As Norman Davies suggests, in these modem times the specialization gives a
T 1 f»
bottomless possibility to know more and more about less and less . However, as one gets in 
touch with a history it usually covers a particular area and time period. Concerning the area 
one can write history of the state or nation. National history is one of the most important 
aspects of one’s identity. Even though regional histories can be devoted to specific areas, 
despite their national or political dependency, regions themselves usually remain slippery in 
their definition. At last, historian can write a history of the world. All these histories can 
constitute an essay or multi-volumed editions. The time scope is theoretically as wide as one
309 Berend, ‘What is Central and Eastern Europe?’, p. 415.
310 Davies, Europe, p 1.
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can begin tracing the history and it can end, theoretically, with the end of time, when there is 
nothing for anyone to recall.
Probably the least problematic in an areal scope is the history of the world, as it 
constitutes the well ordered area - the World itself. National histories tend to concentrate on 
the area the nation is or was living. It is problematic with the stateless nations, but for national 
histories it is not the land, but the people are the cornerstone. The regional histories, however, 
might be really clearly embedded on certain territory, but some of the regions are more than 
territories, besides their spatial connotation.
This is the situation in the case of European history. As one tries to trace the history of 
Europe, one must begin with questions such as what and when is Europe? In other words, the 
history of the concept plays an important role in the writing. What is more, Europe itself has 
as much internal divisions as there can be approaches to treat its history. But the most 
important aspect is that all these divisions are constructions of human mind. They have to deal 
with ‘imagined geography - ways of perceiving spaces and places, and the relationships 
between them, as complex sets of cultural and political practices and ideas defined spatially, 
rather than regarding them as static, discrete territorial units’.311 The important aspect of 
Hagen’s definition is the ‘complex set’; in other words, it is not only about the territory, but
about the ideas attributed to it. Regional constructs are ‘discursive formations, tense
i p
constellations of power, knowledge and spatiality’. It depends on who and when is writing 
and what knowledge is possessed.
Trying to retrace history of Eastern Europe brings historian first of all to the definition 
of the concept. How, when and what influenced, changed and shaped it? The formation of the 
concept becomes a subject of history, but as one cannot exclude it from the general history of 
the area it is its resource at the same time. In other words, every resource about the area 
history tells something about the concept itself. And what is meant by the concept depends on 
those power and knowledge constellations, which are subject of history. It depends on the 
particular time of writing, the view-point of writing and area one is writing from.
Eastern Europe for every historian can start with very different countries. It can start in 
Hungary, or Poland, Lithuania or Ukraine depending where historian “stands” and which 
directions he looks to. Generally the sources about Eastern Europe are dependent on the 
power constellation on the whole continent. During the period of imperial power politics 
before the First Word War, when the continent was divided between empires, the history of
311 Hagen, ‘Redrawing the Imagined Map of Europe’, p. 490.
312 Hagen, ‘Redrawing the Imagined Map of Europe’, p. 490.
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Eastern Europe as the history of the distinct region was not apparent. It was the age of Europe 
formed by power relations and the rise of nationalisms, which shaped the aspirations of 
several future countries, the phenomenon which took place on a scale of the whole continent. 
However, it was Empires and their glory which were matter of historical importance. After 
the First World War, when old European concert system collapsed and the belt of the newly 
independent states was created, the rise of national histories of the countries can be observed. 
What is more, these histories tend to form a unified claim for the reincorporation of forgotten 
into general European history and claim for the distinct history of their own region. That is 
why Oscar Halecki distinguished not two Europes, but four. It is the knowledge formed 
trough national histories, which led to the claim of the regional differences, and rather 
exclusiveness not inclusiveness from specific (Eastern) region.
Historians from East Central Europe in this case can be better prepared. As they start 
with their own national histories and the search of their placements in Europe, they learn both, 
the European history (or mainly history of the West) and regional history. Western historians, 
blinded by former power constellations, which ignored large areas of Europe, as obscure 
“nothing important, undeveloped” East might fall into the trap of not-knowing and relying too 
much on the political picture of the day. Norman Davies provided at least eleven variants of 
the history of Western civilization which were associated with European history313 (such as 
Roman Empire, French variant or American variant). Every variant had an important core and 
less important periphery, letting the great powers to receive all attention and leave lesser 
states, weak economies or minor cultures unconsidered, although they occupy a large part of 
overall scene.314 The most classic example of such thinking is the Cold War era. With the Iron 
Curtain deep in mind of the historian, it becomes a line, of major importance. It becomes a 
subject of imagined geography, attributing cultural and political practices, which “formed” 
the line trough time. The same line becomes an important division between civilized Romans 
and barbarians; natural German space, touched by roman civilization, and one conquered 
from Slavs; the space attributed to Carolingian and Holy Roman Empires and so on. In none 
of these cases the border is exact, but the line usually runs “almost trough the same area”. One 
cannot deny the situation, the constellation of power and their enforced lines and do not 
compare it with the past. It is hard to write about Europe and its unity, when the division 
looks persisting.
313 Davies, Europe, pp. 22-25.
314 Davies, Europe, p. 25.
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7.1. The particular moment of history
During the Cold War era it was easy to say, what was East and What was West simply 
pointing to the political division of the continent and attributing Europe only to the West, and 
look for the facts, which fall into the general division. When Oscar Halecki was writing the 
history of East Central Europe in the 1950’s, he tried to show that influence of Western 
civilization reached further when many scholarly works portrayed in his times. He wrote the 
history of East Central Europe - of the lands in between - arguing that Europe should be 
divided not into two, but into four parts. He wanted to show that between Germany and 
Russia lays the lands with rich history and culture, arguing against the neglect of the region in 
writing and teaching of European history.315 He stressed that disappearance of the whole 
region ‘created a dangerous tension’ and history has to be portrayed in different light even 
though countries of East Central Europe lost their freedom again.316
Analyzing Europe during and between the wars in his brilliant book ‘From Sarajevo to 
Potsdam’ published in 1966, Taylor described the age of Europe before the First World War 
in nostalgic way. It was Europe where trains could cross the continent, stopping just briefly 
on the borders, where even non-standard railways of Russia and Spain were not an
t  i n
obstacle. It was the World, which faded after the first war and which was shattered after the 
second. Did Taylor imagined in the 1960’s that one day in most of Europe - in the Shengen 
area - one will travel even without stopping at the border, and borders of Russia will not be 
the political and ideological obstacle. He could imagine that this could happen in the future, 
but he could not remove it at the time of writing. He could not escape the time and those 
constellations of power and knowledge - the world around him was the scene and he had to 
deal with it.
Historians writing in the particular time are subjects of their time. That is why Denys 
Hay, writing in the 1980’s sees the division of Europe in ‘renewed moral and spiritual
318withdrawal of Russia’ ; the self-imposed isolation, which makes it hard to talk about history 
of the region of Central or Eastern Europe. European history then tends to become the history 
of European West, and not so of European East, which is hard to know anything about, when 
Iron Curtain is separating two parts. That is why Luigi Barzini in the 1980’s, when talking
315 Halecki. Borderlands, p. 4.
316 Halecki, Borderlands, p. 5.
317 Taylor, Nuo Sarajevo iki Potsdamo. p. 9.
318 Hay, ‘Europe Revisited’, p 5.
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about Europeans, talked about Western European-American alliance, and the ethnic and 
national differences of their ‘sacred egoisms’, which obstruct the formation of united 
Europe319. Nothing is said about the Eastern half of the continent in his considerations, except 
very important decision: that as long as the line runs, there cannot be united Europe. 
However, he did not expect that to end anytime soon. For historian the world around him can 
look firmly embedded as for any other person until it suddenly changes. As Denys Hay puts 
it, ‘a historian tends to reflect the mood of the moment’.320
The mood of the moment of every historical work becomes part of the history itself. 
When writing about Eastern Europe every resource provides a history for understanding and 
is a subject of history by itself. Writings from the pre-War era have their own idea of Eastern 
Europe and one during the Cold War can be imagined somehow differently and by the end, 
the collapse of Cold War system, brings a fierce desire to deconstruct the Wall, and introduce 
other distinctions. Every resource is written in the mood of the moment, and each of them 
reflects the historical interpretation of the particular time: it is history and subject of 
historiography at the same time. The concept of Eastern Europe is shaped and formed not 
only by historical flow of time, but also by the historian, who reflects and analyzes this time 
flow and who depicts the moment and portrays its problematic in the light of his world. 
Eastern Europe is an object and a subject of historiography, it is shaped by the writings and 
the ideas presented in them.
VIII. Conclusions
Conceptualizations of Eastern Europe have taken place throughout European history. 
To understand the process and deconstruct it, one has to analyse events and their 
consequences, taking into account history and other mitigating factors. Additionally, 
European identity has also shaped the concept of Eastern Europe, thus this must also be 
analysed and assessed.
Any analysis of concept formation has to be done in parallel with analyses of 
Europeaness. In other words, Eastern Europe is only ‘eastern’ because it is not western. Its 
relationship with the West is thus an important part of conceptualizing Eastern Europe as a
319 Barzini, Europeans, pp. 260-267.
320 Hay, ‘Europe Revisited’, p. 1.
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whole. These differences between east and west, however, were only depicted when the idea 
of Europe transformed from a geographical one to a cultural notion, suggesting a certain way 
of life. Before it was cultural, the concept of what was ‘eastern’ was much different.
When Europe was associated with Christianity, the division of the East and West was 
based on the branches of Orthodox and Latin Christianity and the lands encompassed there. It 
is important to stress, that after the Great Schism the idea of Europe was increasingly 
associated with Europe’s West, the Occident, sometimes even dismissing Orthodox lands as 
European. This view was also encouraged by the advance and conquests of Ottoman Turks 
and Tartars, which left parts of Europe under foreign and alien rule, constituting Europe’s 
Other - the Orient. The lands in contact with these powers received their ‘eastern’ label not 
only because of their border status, but also because they held similar ‘orient’ manners taken 
from their neighbours in the East. During the Enlightenment, backwardness was attributed 
Eastern areas because of this and was encouraged by a lack in economic development.
The age of Imperialism transformed Europe into a ruling power, which brought 
politics to the forefront of Europe. At this time, Europe became a political project and space 
for unification programs. Though Imperialism ignored the East-West axis (as power relations 
were the ones that mattered), centre-periphery relations ascribed certain lands to East Central 
Europe, which were divided between the imperial powers of Germany, Austria and Russia. 
Centre-periphery relations marginalized Eastern Europe in an economic and cultural sense, 
emphasizing their underdevelopment.
In the twentieth century, European divisions were based on political ideologies. 
Eastern Europe was controlled by mainly authoritarian regimes and later Communist ones, 
which created new politically formed conceptions of the area. After the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, the region was marked by diversity and independent states. Trying to overcome 
the old Cold War division, these states pursued democratic ideals and market economies. And 
today, many have noted the rise of the centre, which marginalizes the opposition between East 
and West.
From a historical perspective several aspects of Eastern Europe can be discerned. 
Whenever the term Eastern Europe is used it signifies not one, but several patterns:
Geographical Eastern Europe is associated with the eastern border of the continent. 
However, this border is problematic because it shifts throughout history. It also signifies close 
contact with powers, which historically served as the European Other in a formation of 
European identity. Another aspect is the complicated situation of Russia’s inclusion and
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exclusion from the continent. Russia being at the same time in Europe and in Asia, received 
its ambiguous status of being not ‘entirely European’. The other lines and divisions, 
constructing the geographical space of Eastern Europe were of political and economical 
character, signifying an area of lesser economic development (second serfdom) or political 
opposition (Communism), but they were based not on geographical parameters, but on the 
differences between Europe’s East and West.
Cultural Eastern Europe bears the distinction of being less civilized than the West. The 
cultural aspect of Eastern Europe was mostly constructed by the discourse of the 
Enlightenment, which attributed backwardness and barbarism to it. Eastern Europe thus 
became a place, which could be cultured and possessed by the stronger ‘more civilized’ 
powers. Cultural differences between the eastern and western halves of Europe were 
employed to depict the ‘lesser’ status of the region. After the collapse of the Cold War 
system, culture is losing its significance. The modem world makes culture the most 
penetrable and border-less phenomenon.
Political Eastern Europe is associated either with political doctrine (Communism) or 
with the political constellation of the continent. It was either the area occupied and divided by 
stronger imperial powers or it served as a ‘buffer zone’ between them. Historically, Eastern 
Europe also means the area, which copied the political institutions of the West and was on the 
borderland of Western influence. Politically, however, the area was not coherent. The 
important concepts of Mitteleuropa and Central Europe are also significant regional 
developments, making only Russia, or the lands outside the European Union, Eastern 
European.
Economic Eastern Europe is marked by a constant push to catch-up with western 
economic development. Economically, the region of Eastern Europe was a provider of raw 
materials for the West, engaging in mostly agricultural practices. It served as the economic 
periphery of the Western core. Industrialization and modernization in the area was scarce 
(with the relative exception of Bohemia), and on a large scale was implemented only during 
Soviet rule. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the economic situation became too 
diverse to put the previously coherent region under one economic banner. Parts of the region 
are catching-up with the West, while the other parts still lack economic efficiency. 
Economically, Eastern European also tends to mean ‘not in the EU’.
Historiographical Eastern Europe is the outcome of historical writing. It is based on 
the ‘mood of time’ and the situation in which a historian finds him or herself. Sometimes 
writings try to confirm these divisions, searching for arguments in history (inventing
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tradition) and sometimes trying to argue against these divisions by showing that the history of 
the region followed a different or distinct path of its own.
Eastern Europe was and is still being constructed by the flow of time. Historically, it 
received labels, which are all awoken, when the concept is used. Conceptualization was a 
long process, and it will proceed as long as Europe exists because the concept of Eastern 
Europe is the construction of the West. Eastern Europe is a shifting concept, and at any 
particular time it can represent the ever-changing mindset of the European people.
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